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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN
GRAND JUNCTIO~. a National
Banking Association,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
12804

RALPH OSBORNE and
JIM L. HUDSON,
Defendants and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEl\IENT OF KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff brought this action on a promissory note
and loan guaranty agreement after acceleration of the
payment date and nonpayment of the principal amount
of $60,000.00 and interest.
I

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT

At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence
the trial court took the case from the jury and directed
a verdict for plaintiff.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant Jim L. Hudson seeks to reverse the
judgment against him and the rulings of the trial court
in refusing to admit offered cv'clence and in directing
the verdict for plaintiff.

STA'l'ElHEXT OF FACTS
This is an appeal by Defendant Hudson from i
directed verdict for Plaintiff First X ational Bank ir
Grand Junction. The action was brought by that banl
against Ralph Os borne and Hudson to collect on a prom
issory note signed by Osborne alone and a separate loat
guaranty agreement on which there appears a signaturt
"Jim L. Hudson." Hudson testified that the signaturt
on the guaranty agreement looks like his signature and
if it is it does not "belong on this piece of paper or in a
bank in Grand Junction." He testified, further, that ht
never knowingly signed the guaranty agreement whicl
is dated June 3, 1969; that the first time he saw it anc
the first time he knew that a loan had been made by tht
2

Grand Junction bank to Osborne was in April, 1970,
when representatives of that bank telephoned him and
then made a trip to lHoab to advise him that they were
accelerating payment under the note; that he never received any of the money loaned to Osborne and was
never contacted by the Grand Junction bank or by any
one else with reference to the loan prior to said date in
April, 1970. The loan in question was granted to Osborne on June 6, 1969. (R. 58, 59) A handwriting ex, pert expressed the opinion at the trial that the signature
' on the loan guaranty agreement is genuine.
Osborne consented to the entry of a default judgment against him. He did not appear at the trial, his attorney would not produce him for the taking of his deposition and he was absent and beyond the jurisdiction. (R.
189) Hudson denied liability and demanded a jury trial.
'\Then the parties rested the District Court took the case
away from the jury and entered a directed verdict for
Plaintiff in the principal sum of $60,000.00 plus interest
of $8,328.66 and costs and expenses and attorney fees in
the amount of $16,707.29.
At the time the Grand Junction bank loaned Osborne the $60,000.00-J une 6, 1969-0sborne was the
executive vice president of the Moab National Bank of
Moab, Utah. That bank was a "correspondent bank" of
the Plaintiff First National Bank in Grand Junction.
Under a "correspondent bank" relationship, among other
things, the smaller bank, in this instance the Moab National Bank, clears its checks through the "big brother"

3

bank, First National Hank in Grand Junction, and if
smaller bank is asked to make loans in excess of its lei
limit it seeks to place the excess portions of the loans w
the larger bank.

.Mr . .Jam es \ V ..Mackley, a vice president and a le
officer of the First National Bank in Grand J uncti1
who handled the loan in question, was also its correspo1
ent bank representative. \Vhile acting in that capac
he would visit correspondent banks, including .Moab ~
tional Uank, from two to four times a year. During st
visits to .Moab National Bank he became acquainl
with Osborne, the executive officer of that bank. ( R. 1

Mr. Mackley testified that in the latter part of M:
1969, Osborne telephone him from )loab and stated tl
he wanted to borrow $tiO,OOO.OO; that he (Mackley)
viewed financial statements Osborne had given I
Grand Junction bank in connection with several mt:
smaller prior loans never exceeding $3500.00, and
then advised Osborne that he would not be able to me;
the loan; that in a subsequent conversation Osbm
stated "that he would offer a co-signer," and that at so:
point he said the co-signer would be .Jim L. Hudson,~
lived in Moab. ( R. 129) :Mackley also testified as f
lows:
That at the time Osborne mentioned Hudso
name he (.Mackley) did not know Hudson, or anythi
about him; that he told Osborne he would need a fin:
cial statement from Hudson. (R. 129-130)
4

That Osborne mailed Mackley a financial statement
a which Hudson had furnished and addressed to the Moab
t' National Hank in connection with an entirely different
matter according to Hudson (R. 59-63) dated June l,
1969, and signed an<l witnessed June 2, 1969, (Plain1 tiff's Exhibit No. 2); that on June 3, 1969, Mackley
'f wrote Osborne acknowledging receipt of Hudson's fie nancial statement and "enclosing note for your signal ture and that of Jim L. Hudson." (Defendant's Exhibit
i No. 28) ( R. 133) In this letter Mackley wrote that he
c would need a current financial statement from Osborne
e in support of the loan.

l

On the front and back of the printed note form
1; Mackley sent to Osborne (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3) the
following had been typewritten: "Unsee. Co-signed Jim
't L. Hudson." On the bank's ledger sheet pertaining to
n this loan (Defendant's Exhibit .No. 21) the following
c had been typed: "Co-signed by: Jim L. Hudson." The
~promissory note form used also had a signature line for
\a guarantor. Osborne did not obtain Hudson's signature
1 on the note, as Mackley had requested in his letter. The
r only signature on the note was Osborne's. (R. 134)

1<

lo

\\Then .Mr. :Mackley
was asked whether he did any•
thing to verify the accuracy of Hudson's financial statement he replied: "I cannot remember exactly what steps
nI did take. I know that I satisfied myself that it was valid
1 and proceeded to grant the loan." 'Vhen asked whether
11 he was implying that he did take some steps to verify the
financial statement he replied:

s

"A. I am saying that I can·t remember at th
point in time what I might have done to verify
l would like to say this, in my deposition given
the court a year ago in October, I stated that
called the, l think my words were that I callt
the credit bureau. 1 have subsequently-the cred
bureau in Moab. I have subsequently checked 01
telephone record. I made a spontaneous stateme1
that day that I have been unable to verify. I ca1
not state at this time that I did check with cl
credit bureau. In checking our own records of ti
bank, the telephone billing, the billing from ti
credit bureau I can find no record of that ai
therefore I cannot say at this time that I checkt
with them. I am saying only that I satisfied rn
self that it was a valid statement. I cannot sta
what those sources were." ( R. 134-135)

When questioned further as to what he might have do1
to satisfy himself of the validity of the financial stat
ment he testified:

"A. Mr. Saperstein, when dealing with bas
ally people who you have dealt with over a peri
of time and you, there are certain things that y
rely on when you are dealing with one bank of
cer to another and these things are, you are de
ing in a little different position than you do wh
you are dealing with people that are entirely t
known to you." ( R. 135)

1

Mr ..Mackley's deposition was published at the requi
of counsel for Defendant Hudson, and Mackley :
knowledged he had testified that in handling Osborn
request he did the "normal things that we would
through in trying to ascertain whether or not we co1
grant a loan or virtually the same as we would do w
6

hanybody in spite of the fact that Ralph was a loan officer
1
' himself. And certainly aware of the routine that we fol1t1lowed." ( R. 136)

:~

.Mr ..Mackley also testified that at the time his depoJusition was taken the only thing he told counsel that he
e1did to verify the financial statement of Mr. Hudson was
aito call the credit bureau, and that when he was testifying
~at the trial he could not remember anything else that he
~tdid. (R. 138)

Mr. Mackley testified while under examination by
~~counsel for Defendant Hudson that on April 6, 1970,
:aisome nine or ten months after the loan was made, he telephoned 1"Ir. Hudson in Moab; that that was the first
orcontact he had had with Mr. Hudson and the first time
1t1he had talked with him; and that his motivation in calling Mr. Hudson at that time was because he had heard
.that Ralph Osborne was leaving the Moab National
11
'~ Bank. ( R. 155-156) He also identified a copy of a letter
~~e wrote to Mr. Osborne on June 23, 1970, (Defendant's
,fJExhibit No. 27). (R. 156) At that time Mr. Osborne
eawas in Malibu Beach, California. Mackley's letter was as
hf.follows:

in

UI

)U

.vi

"Dear Ralph:
"I was planning to reach you earlier today and I
find that you and your family apparently left
Moab yesterday. I am writing you to request that
you call me collect as soon as possible. I'm not
certain exactly what is going to happen in our
case with Hudson, but I would certainly appreciate it if you would take the time to call me and
7

answer a few questions that could assist me grea
ly in bringing this case in our favor.

"I'm certain that yuzt can appreciate the positit
that I arn in at this time, and I hope that .lJOU tCi
feel inclined to cooperate with me in this matte
Very truly yours,

Jam es W. Mackle1
Yice President" ·

(Emphasis added)

Counsel for Defendant H nelson called as a witne·
l\ilrs. :Mabel Stengal, owner and manager of the Cred
Bureau of l\loab who testified that her records did Ill
disclose any inquiries from the First ~ ati1mal Bank·
Grand .T unction or any billings to that bank about ti
financial responsibility of l\lr. Hudson. Counsel for ti
Grand .Junction hank stipulated that her records "woul
so show that she didn't have any billings or any [
quiries." (R. 167)

'Vhen Osborne returned the promissory note whil
he alone had signed, he also included a printed form Lo:
Guaranty Agreement on which there is an unwitnesst
signature "Jim L. Hudson." (Plaintiff's Exhibit ~
l) . When asked whether he contacted ::\Ir. II udson pri
to disbursing the $60,000.00, l\fr. Mackley testified th
he attempted one phone call only to Hudson which l
did not complete; never called him again, nor even wro
him. He testified that he compared the signature on tl
loan guaranty with Hudson's witnessed signature on ti
financial statement ( R. 140) ; that it is not his practice
either meet with or in any fashion contact out of to11
1

8

reaguarantors to verify the guarantee, even if the guarantor
is unknown, so long as he (Mackley) is satisfied everyritic thing is in order; that he couldn't presently recall what
~ tv1 steps he took to so satisfy himself. (R. 142-145)
1tte
s
\Vhen aske<l how the funds were disbursed, Mr.
, Mackley testified that the proceeds of the loan were dis1
{~
• ·bursed directly to or for the benefit of Osborne and that
none of the proceeds were disbursed to Hudson. (R.
tne~

141)

red

\"Tith reference to the Grand Junction bank's nori Ill mal practice of not arranging meetings, face to face, with
nk; out-of-town guarantors, Mr. Mackley testified as fol1t ti lows:
>r tl
voul

y

li

:vhil

Lrn

1ess1

t ~

pn1

!th

ch l
wro

rn tl

)Il

tl

tice
t011

"Q. Now, :Mr. :Mackley, did you at any time
ever request that .Mr. Osborne arrange a meeting
face to face with you and Mr. Hudson prior to
the disbursement of any of these funds?
"A. No, sir, this is not normally done.
"Q. Not normally done in your bank?

"A. \Vhere the party is out of town we normally don't put the borrower to that- I don't know
the word I'm looking for. \Ve normally don't do
that when we are dealing with out of town borrowers. * * * *
"Q. Now did you ever contact-I will go back
to that, you said that it wasn't the practice to do it,
that is true even if the guarantor is completely unknown to you you never want to sit down and
meet with him and verify that guarantee even if
he is unknown to you, is that true?

9

"A. There might be circumstances that \\
would make an exception, but basically I woul
say that is true." (R. 142-143)

Mr..Mackley, while under examination by couns1
for Defendant Hudson, testified that he did not advh
the loan committee of his bank about the loan to Osborn
because "there was no reason to." In answer to a que!
tion whetht.:r he advised the board of directors of t1
Grand Junction bank about the loan he answered: "Tb
directors review these loans on a periodic basis." \Vhe
asked whether he advised any other officer or agent 1
the bank about the loan prior to disbursing the funds h
answered: "I cannot swear that I did, no." Asked whetl
er he could swear that he did not, he answered that Ii
didn't recall, and then testified:

"A. As a matter of fact the president of OL
bank says that he was fully aware of the loan pri1
to my granting it. I frankly do not remember di
cussing it with him, but he ~ays that he knew a
about it and was aware of it prior to the date th:
it was disbursed. I do not remember.'' (R. 149)

The answer of the President of the Grand J unctic
bank, George B. McKinley, to an interrogatory sul
mitted by counsel for Dcf endant Hudson was publishe1
The interrogatory and the answer read into the recor
are:
Interrogatory: "\Vho participated in the di
cision to make the loan alleged in your complaint
Answer: "The decision to makt the loan wt
made solely by James \V. Mackley." (R. 161)
Mr. McKinley did not testify at the trial.

10

\
The handwriting expert, l\fr. John J. Harris, of
l Los Angeles, California, called by counsel for Plaintiff,
testified that the signature on the Loan Guaranty Agrees1
•
. signature
.
. ment was a genume
an d aut lientic
of De f end~ ant Hudson, based upon his comparison of that signan ture with testament signatures presented to him as the
e! authentic writing of ~Ir. Hudson. (R. 28) He also testih fied that he had compared typewritten exemplars taken
hfrom typewriters in the First National Bank in Grand
eJunction and in the :Moab National Bank with type1' written material in the Loan Guaranty Agreement
h (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. I) and the promissory note
l executed by Osborne (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3). Mr.
Harris testified that the following typewritten words
and figures appearing in the first paragraph of the Loan
L Guaranty Agreeme11t are the same type as on exemplars
1 he received of words and figures typewritten on type:writers in the .Moab National Bank:

11

I

"Ralph Osborne .Moab, Utah First National
Bank, Grand Junction, Colo. Sixty Thousand
and ---------------no/IOO." ( R. 33)
Further, he testified that the word and figures "3rd
June, 1969" in the last two lines of the Loan Guaranty
Agreement are the same type as found on the typewriters
found in the Moab National Bank. (R. 33) He also testified that the words "Colorado" and "Grand Junction,
Colorado" which are written in blanks in the sixth paragraph and in the last two lines of the Loan Guaranty
Agreement compare with the exemplar he had received
of material typewritten on a typewriter in the Grand
11

Junction bank. ( R. 41) He concluded that the typewr:
ing on the promissory note (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. ;
mailed to Mackley by Osborne is the same style of ty1
or font as the typewriting on the exemplar from the Fir
National Hank in Grand Junction. (R. 41) .Mr. Mac~
ley testified that while he did not recall, it was "ve1
possible" that the words "Colorado" and "Grand Jun
tion, Colorado'' were added by the secretary in his offi
to the Loan Guaranty Agreement after it was receiY1
from Osborne and "prior to filing." (R. 149)
Defendant .Tim L. Hudson testified that he mai
tained a small checking account with the l\'loab Nation
Bank and that it was through his business with that bar
that he became acquainted with Osborne; that startii
in 1968 he bought some certificates of deposit at th
bank; and on one occasion he cashed some of the certil
cates of deposit before their due date. In this connectir
he testified as follows:
"Q. Did you have those redeemed or cashed
by the bank?

"A. I think they were for a ninety day period
I recall, and I let them run ninety days and
think I received my interest and something can
up after that and I went and cashed the savin.
certificates before another ninety days was up. :
"Q. I see, and who cashed those in for you
behalf of the bank?

"A. Ralph Osborne.
"Q. Where did this particular transaction ta'
place?
12

"A. At his desk. * * *
"Q. Now at the time that you cashed those time
certificates of deposit did you sign any document
that you recall?

"A. I know I signed something.
"Q. Did you have any conversation with Mr.
Osborne with respect to cashing in these time certificates of deposit? * * *

"A. Yes. Did we have a conversation.
"Q. 'Vith respect to the fact that you were
cashing in the time certificates ?

"A. I would not be able to draw interest on the
note, on the savings certificate for this period.
I'd have to forego I think it was about half way
through the ninety days, the second ninety days
or so, and I would have to give up my interest
from the beginning of the period till-* * *
"Q. Did he present any document to you for
your signature relating to this question of interest
if you recall? * * *

"A. I know I was required to sign something.
"Q. You don't recall what it was?

"A. Not exactly." (R. 51-54)
Counsel showed l\Ir. Hudson Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 2, a financial statement signed by him on June 2,
1969, one day before the date of the loan guaranty agreement. Mr. Hudson acknowledged that he signed the financial statement. He then testified as follows:
"Q. All right, sir. Now prior to the date that
this financial statement bears, have you had any

13

discussion relative to that financial staternen
with Ralph Osborne?* * *
"A. Yes, in the bank in the Moab N ationa
Bank at Moab.
"Q. And who was present at that time?

"A. Torn Stocks and myself with Ralph o~
borne.
"Q. What was the occasion for your being i
the Moab National Bank on that date?

"A. He said he had something he wanted
talk to me about. * * *

1,

"Q. When?
"A. This would have been probably about, i
was"Q. When, with respect to the date this finan
cial stater11c:nt b'-ars, maybe lhat would help you
"A. Probably a week or ten days before.
"Q. I see. How did the invitation take place?

"A. I believe he called on the phone. * * *
"Q. Where did this conversation with Mr.
borne take place at the bank?

n

"A. Partially upstairs and .Mr. Osborne invitei
us down to the basement. * * *
"Q. Will you tell us what Mr. Osborne said 1
you at that time?
1

"A. He said that Mr. McCormick who own
the bank in :Moab was getting old and his heal!
was bad and he wanted to possibly sell the bani
And said my name had come up several time
14

with other directors that I might purchase some
interest in the bank or stock.
"Q. Now was this McCormick's stock in the
bank?

"A. l presume that is what he was talking
about.
"Q. I see. \Vas Mr. J\11cCormick the president
of the bank at the time?
"A. He was president of the bank at that time.
"Q. All right, what else was said? Do you recall
whether there was any discussion about price of
the stock?

"A. Yes, and I told him I didn't have that kind
of money that what it would take to buy that up,
and he said this could be arranged through another bank in Grand Junction.
"Q. Did he name the bank in Grand Junction?

"A. He named the United States Bank in
Grand Junction is what he named.
"Q. And what else did he say in connection
with that?

"A. That this bank would be made, if this could
be arranged that the money could be borrowed
from the United States Bank over there, and the
bank would loan it if they would make the Moab
National Bank the corresponding bank. Whatever that is.
"Q. I see. Did Mr. Osborne indicate to you
what interest he had in this transaction?

"A. I think it was indicated that he would like
to retain his position in the bank.
15

"Q. In the .Moab National Bank?

"A. In the Moab National Bank.
"Q. I see. All right, and what else was said tha
you recall? 'Vas there any discussion at that tiru
with respect to this financial statement?
"A. Yes there was. He needed a financial statt
ment on me. The bank wanted one. The Moa
National Bank I d ne,·er gJYe them one and l1
done some business there.
"Q. Did Osborne tell you that at that time?

"A. He wanted a financial statement. The ban 1
wanted one. The .Moab National Bank, I guei
the other directors and things would want to st ,
what I was.
"Q. 'Vhat did you say?
"A. I said I would have Mr. Stocks fix one U[

***

"Q. All right, and was a financial statemen
then prepared by Mr. Stocks for your signature
"A. Yes it was.
"Q. And the financial statement, what I shm1
ed you earlier that has been received in evidenc
here, is that document, is that correct?
"A. That is true. * * *
"Q. How, .Mr. Hudson, after this financi<
statement was prepared did you deliver that t
Mr. Osborne?
"A. No, Tom Stocks delivered it to Ralph 0
borne.
"Q. Did you ever have any subsequent convt1
sation with Mr. Osborne after this financial stati
ment was delivered to him?
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"A. Yes, I saw him a month or so later. I asked
him how that deal was coming along we talked
about. And he said l\Ir. McCormick recovered
his health and wasn't interested in selling the
bank any more.
"Q. Did you ever have any further conversation
with him about that stock acquisition?

"A. None whatsoever." (R. 60-64)
.Mr. Hudson testified that prior to the time two representatives of the First National Bank in Grand J unction came to :Moab to see him, which was in April, 1970,
.Mr. Mackley called him by telephone and told him they
were going to accelerate the Osborne loan. Mr. Hudson
replied that he was not on any loan with Ralph Osborne,
and Mackley then said he was going to come to Moab
with his attorney. l\Ir. Hudson said he then called his
attorney in Salt Lake City, and that before the representatives of the Grand Junction bank arrived in Moab
Ralph Osborne called him by telephone and wanted to
know if he could come to his office and talk with him.
(R. 64-65) Hudson's further testimony was as follows:
"Q. 'Ve have got to the point I believe, Mr.
Hudson, prior to the objection when the jury was
excused. After the telephone call and where Mr.
Osborne had arrived at the office, and I believe
you testified that when he came in Mr. Stocks and
you were present at that time, is that correct?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Then I believe you also said that Mr.
Stocks left, is that correct?

"A. He was asked to leave, yes.
17

[At p. u8 of the Hecord ~Ir. Hudson identifie1
Osborne as the one who asked Tom to leave th
room.]
"Q. All right, now after .l\Ir. Stocks left tha
just left you and .l\Ir. Osborne in the room tc
gether, is that correct?
"A. Yes.***
"Q. 'Vhat did .Mr. Osborne say to you at thi
time and what did you say to him?

"A. \Vell, he asked me if the bank had callt
me from Graud .Junction. I said yes. He"Q. \Vhat did you say to him 1

"A. I asked him why he would do such a thini

1

"Q. What did you say to him? 'Vhat did yo :
say, give us the words as closely as you can rt
member, l\1r. Hudson?

"A. I said, Ralph what in the world ever
sessed you to do such a thing as that.

"

po~ 1

"Q. \Vhat did he say?

(

"A. He said, well set there and see all thi 1
money going by and eyery day and everybod ~
getting some but me.
"Q. 'Vas there anything further said?
"A. Yes, he wanted to know if we couldn
work something out. If I couldn't buy some clairn
off him or something that would pay this thin
off. \Ve didn't have nothing to discuss.
"Q. 'Vas there anything further said aftt
that?
"A. You mean at a different time or right ther1

18

"Q. No, during that conversation, included in
that conversation.

"A. Well, he mentioned something that he'd
come up with half of the money, that he'd sell me
some claims for the other half or anything. * * *
"Q. During the period of time that you were
acquainted with Mr. Osborne had you ever had
any personal business relationship with him on a
personal basis other than as he might have been
appearing in a representative capacity for the
bank?

"A. None." (R. 76-78)

Mr. Thomas A. Stocks was called as a witness for
~ the Defendant Hudson. He testified that he did Mr.
1
Hudson's accounting work, and that he and Mr. Hudson
t jointly own the building where they have their offices.
He testified that on April 6, 1970, when Osborne came
·~ to his office Osborne asked him if he and Mr. Hudson
could use his office. At that time he left his office and
was not present when .Mr. Hudson and Mr. Osborne had
u their conversation. He said that he was present when
1 Osborne had his conversation with Mr. Hudson in May,
1969 about acquiring stock in the Moab National Bank.
When asked to relate that conversation he testified:
"A. And he told Jim and I that he was concerned about, or he wanted to know if Jim was
interested in buying some stockholder's interest
in the bank because he, Bill McCormick was old
and not feeling well and that he was contemplating starting a bank in Roosevelt when he felt
would be denied by the Banking Commission and
he felt that Mr. McCormick would be willing to
19

sell his stock if he didn t get the bank up in Hoos1
velt. And would Jim be interested in acqrnriu
that stock, and if so he went on to say that if Ju
didn't have the funds that he could arrange fl
some low interest money from the U. S. Bank i
Grand Junction, Colorado, at some six per cer
interest. Six and a half.

<
.

1

'

(

~

1

"Q. All right, what else was said at that turn r

"A. He said that, he said that he would need l
financial statement from Jim and Jim said you ~
have to talk to him about that and Jim left U I
room and Osborne said to me, we should get sorn (
of this low interest money and buy some stock toi t
and I said I don't want any stock, I need H
money to buy groceries, not stock." ( R. 17 5-176 :

.

.Mr. Stocks prepared the financial statement and took ,
to .Mr. Osborne. Under cross examination he stated th, t
Mr. Osborne told him that Mr. McCormick might l <
willing to dispose of his stock at any time, and that ti 1
occasion might cume suddenly. ( R. 177)
Counsel for the defendant Hudson sought to intrr
duce evidence to show that the purpose for which tl
loan was made awl the use to \vhich $45,000.00 of tl
proceeds of the loan were put by Osborne was to cover
series of outstanding unrecorded certificates of depos
previously issued and sold by Osborne in behalf of tl
Moab National Bank, the proceeds of which had bet
embezzled by Osborne. This evidence was excluded t
the court as irrelevant and it was made the subject of
formal offer of proof. (R. 112-120). The proffer crn
sisted of the proposed testimony of Martha Dohse, tl
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cashier of the .Moab National Hank, who conducted an
investigation and inspection of the records of that bank
when it became known in .May of 1970 that Ralph
Osborne, one of its executive officers, had borrowed
$60,000.00 from the Plaintiff Bank one year earlier. (R.
116) As a result of her investigation .Mrs. Dohse determined that thret: certificates of deposit had been issued
by the Bank, for which there was no record; that
$45,000.00 of the proceeds of Osborne's loan with the
plaintiff was credited to the certificates of deposit ledger
of the Moab Bank; and that the three unrecorded cer. tificates of deposit were redeemed or renewed after June
: 10, 1969, by the holders thereof and totalled $45,000.00.
All underlying documents to which she referred were
offered in evidence in support of Mrs. Dohse's proposed
' testimony. In addition counsel offered an exemplified
I copy of the indictment issued by the United States Disi trict Court for the District of Utah in the criminal case
of "United States of America vs. Ralph Osborne,"
charging Osborne with embezzlement of the funds re1
[ ceived in exchange for each of the said three certificates
l of deposit and an exemplified copy of the minute entry
r recording Osborne's plea of guilty thereto. (R. ll8)
s Said offer of proof is set out in full in the appendix here} to.

Counsel for defendant Hudson also sought to intro\ duce evidence of a conversation occurring in April, 1970,
f between Osborne and the witness, 'Villiam S. May, an11 other employee of the Moab National Bank. May testitl! fied in the absence of the jury as follows:

:e
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"Q. \Vho else was present 1

"A. No one ..Myself and l\Ir. Osborne. Th
statement he made at that time was to the effec\
well I might as well tell you about it, you'll kno1,
about it anyway. I asked him what he meant, an
he said there was an unlisted loan at the First Na
tional Bank in the amount of Sixty Thousani
dollars.
"Q. First National Bank of what?

"A. First National Bank of Grand J unctior
And I never thought too much about it one wa'
or another, and I asked him how the loan corn
about and he said that Jim Hudson guarantee,
the loan. And he said, that 1 finally was able t
hang one in him. I've been laying for him fo
some time and I finally got the chance to do i;
And that was about the extent of the conversatio;
that afternoon." (R.108)
The court excluded this as immaterial and as hear
say. (R. 111-112)
Counsel for defendant Hudson also sought to elic1
the opinion of J olm M. Chatelain, Senior Examiner o
the Utah Department of Financial Institutions and:
qualified witness (R. 190-192) for the purpose of estao
lishing that the conduct of James ,V . .:\Iackley in makin:
the loan to Osborne was neither prudeut nor in conform
ity with reasonable commercial standards of the bani
ing industry. In the absence of the jury, Mr. Chatelair
based upon counsel's hypothetical question, expresse
his opinion that 1\Iackley's conduct was neither that of a
ordinary prudent banker nor was it in conformity wit
reasonable commercial standards in the banking ii

22

dustry. He further testified that in order to conform to
such standards :Mackley should have made contact with
Hudson, preferably in person, but in any event under
' circumstances that Mackley knew that the person with
whom he spoke was Hudson, inasmuch as he was unknown to Mackley and the loan was made on the basis of
the guarantee. (R. 194-199). This testimony was excluded as irrelevant. (R. 201).
Each of the foregoing offers of proof are set out in
' the Appendix hereto.

1

J

ARGUNIENT
The trial Court took the case from the jury and directed a verdict for plaintiff after hearing the evidence
received, and after hearing offers of proof as to evidence
which the Court refused to admit. In Point V of this
Argument we discuss the error of the trial Court in concluding that the evidence when viewed in the light most
favorable to defendant Hudson, discloses no genuine
issue as to any material fact. In Points I, II, III, and
IV we take up the rulings of the trial Court refusing to
receive offered evidence and point out questions which
should have been submitted to the jury, after which, we
believe, the error of the Court in directing the verdict
will be all the more evident.
POINT I.

IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
n REFUSE TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OFFERED
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BY APPELLANT THAT OSBORNE USE!
$45,000.00 OF THE llORROYVED ~IONEY T(
REPLACE i\IONEY OSBORNE HAD PRE
YIOUSLYDIYEHTED TO HIS O\VN PERSON
AL USE AND BENEFIT FR0.1\1 THE "CER'l'J
FICATES OF DEPOSIT'' ACCOUNT OF THJ
MOAB NATIONAL BANK.
At the trial :Mackley testified that upon approva
of the loan to Osborne the $60,000.00 was disbursed b!
issuing a credit memo, dated June 6, 19669, to the Moa!
National Bank, of which Osborne was the executive offi
cer. 'Vritten across the face of the credit memo was th
following: "Ralph Osborne Note." (Defendant's Ex
hibit No. 30).
\Vhen counsel for defendant Hudson sought to in
troduce evidence as to what Osborne did with the bor
rowed money, however, the Court sustained Plaintiff'
objections to the testimony. The following is a brie
resume of the offer of proof made by counsel for defend
ant Hudson:
Counsel for defendant Hudson identified a
being in Court .l\Irs ..Margaret Dohse, Cashier o
the :Moab National Bank. He also identifie1
through Mrs. Dohse certain records of the Moal
bank which she had brought with her to the Cour
room. He stated that the offered testimony o
Mrs. Dohse and the records so produced (col
lectively marked for identification purposes :i
Defendant's Exhibit No. 33) would disciose thn
upon receipt of the credit memo from the Gram
Junction bank Osborne issued a credit memo t
1
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the "Certificates of Deposit" account in the Moab
Hank transferring to that account $45,000.00 of
the borrowed money to replace money which Osborne previously had diverted from that account;
that the other $15,000.00 of the borrowed money
received by Osborne through his issuance to himself of three cashier's checks, each for $5,000.00,
which were redeemed by the Moab Bank without
endorsement; that prior to the issuance by Osborne of the credit memo transferring $45,000.00
to the certificates of deposit account, on June 9,
1969, there was a shortage in that account of
$45,000.00; that the carbon copies of three time
certificates of deposit, (Nos. 129, 179 and 7 5, in
the amounts of $15,000.00, $10,000.00 and $20,000.00 respectively-see Defendant's Exhibit
No. 33) were missing; that subsequent to that
date, June 9, 1969, two of those time certificates
of deposit were redeemed by the bank from customers who had purchased the certificates of deposit and the other certificate was renewed; that
the funds which Osborne diverted from the certificates of deposit account were appropriated by
Os borne to his own personal use and benefit
through the issuance of cashier's checks ( 17 in
number; copies of which are parts of Defendant's
Exhibit 33 for identification purposes); that these
cashier's checks were issued and signed by Osborne in July and August of 1967, and March and
May of 1969; and that the total of those cashier's
checks is $65,000.00. (R. 22-25) (The complete
off er of proof is set out in the Appendix to this
Brief.)
Counsel for defendant Hudson also offered in evidence an exemplified copy of an indictment, returned by
a federal Grand Jury in the District Court of the United
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States for the Distr,d of Vtah, charging Osborne wit!
embezzlement of said sums of money ($15,000.00
$10,000.00, aud $:.W,000.00) from the :Moab N ationa
Bank to pay his own personal obligations. Attached ti
the copy of ihe indictment was an exempiified copy of~
minute entry of proceulings before that federal court or,
February 5, 1!)71, at 'vhich time Osborne entered a plea
of guilty to each count uf the indictment. ( Defendanh
Exhibit numbered for identification purposes as No. 31)
The significance of the offered evidence as to wha:
Osborne actually did with the borrowed money lies ir
the following:
I. That evidence bears directly upon the ques
tion: What was Osborne's real reason for borrow
ing the money? No one will contend that the Firs
National Bank would have loaned the money ti
Osborne if it had known that he was going to us1
the money to conceal his embezzlements. And rn
one will contend that Hudson, even if he had beer
advised of the loan application, would have dom
anything to help Osborne conceal his misappro
priations of money from the bank of which he wa:
the executive officer, or from any other bank 0
institution. It is logical, therefore, to infer fron
this evidence that Osborne deceived both Hudsor
and the First National Bank.

1

2. The use of borrowed funds to replace mone:

embezzled from the Moab bank was the final ac
in the scheme or plan devisl'cl by Osborne to con
ceal his unlawful acts. Other parts of this scherni
were: (a) to obtain a loan from the First N ationa
Bank without disclosing the true purpose fo
which he needed the money; (b) to obtain a gen
26

uine signature from Hudson on a financial statement by deceiving him to believe it would be used
in an entirely unrelated proposed venture to buy
control of the Moab Bank; (c) by deception and
trick obtain Hudson's signature on a loan guaranty agreement and to submit the same to the
bank in support of the loan application; ( d) use
the genuine and witnessed signature of Hudson
on his financial statement to convince the First
National Bank that there was no need to contact
Hudson to verify his willingness and intention to
guarantee the proposed loan; and (e) to further
conceal his embezzlements by failing to advise the
directors of the Moab National Bank of the loan
he had obtained from the First National Bankconcealment of the loan from the directors of his
bank was a violation of federal statute which requires that when an officer of a national bank obtains a loan of this size from another bank the
loan must be disclosed in writing by the borrower
to his board of directors. (Title 12 U.S.C. Sec.
375a)

Section 375n of Title 12, U.S.C. provides in subdivision (I) what l'.~ans a national bank may make to its
own executiYe officers. SubdiYision ( 6) provides as follows:
" ( 6) 'Vhenever an executive officer of a member bank becomes indebted to any bank or banks
(other than the one of which he is an officer) on
account of extensions of credit of any one of the
three categories respectively referred to in paragraphs (2) [mortgage loam not exceeding $30,000.00), (3) [educational loans not exceeding
$10,000.00], and ( 4) [general limitation of $5,000.00 on loans not otherwise specifically authorized] in an aggregate amount greater than the
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aggregate amount of credit of the same categori
that could lawfully be extended to him by th;
bank, he shall make a written report to the boan
of directors of the bank, statmg the date arn
amount of each such extension of credit, the se
curity therefor, and the purposes for which th
proceeds have been or are to be used."
Osborne·s scheme or plan depended upon (I) de
ceiving everyone involved as to his real purpose in ob
taining the borrowed funds, and ( 2) concealing every
thing, even the fact of the loan itself, from Hudson am
the board of directors of the :Moab National Hank. Thi
similarity of all of his acts, involving misrepresentation
concealment, and deception is evident. His goal-con
cealment of his embezzlements-was to be accomplishe1
by using the borrowed money to replace the money h
had diverted and appropriated to his own personal us:
and benefit. The use he made of the borrowed fund
throws the spotlight on each of his separate acts and d~
closes his motives, his intent, his purpose and his desigi
and scheme. The fact that the use of the money borrowe1
from the bank discloses prior criminal activity on th
part of Osborne does not make the evidence inadmissiblt
The clear, concise and indubitable proof offered wit'
reference to the use of the money to conceal earlier dt
falcations justifies the making of inferences with respel
to Osborne's acts of misrepresentation and deception 1
dealing with the Grand Junction bank, in dealing wit
Hudson, and in dealing with his own bank, all in con
nection with the matter of borrowing $60,000.00. It i
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for that purpose that the evidence was offered-not to
prove the commission of other crimes.
The trial Court was "worried" about whether disclosure of what Osborne did with the borrowed money
would "inflame the jury to the extent that they, well by
golly we're goiug to find this way regardless, any fellow
that will do that will do anything." (R. IO). Also, although the trial Court thought that Hudson would not
have signed the loan guaranty agreement if he had known
of Osborne's embezzlements, he believed that what Hudson learned later as to how the money was used had no
bearing upon the question of whether he signed the guaranty. (R. 14-15)
In discussing the question whether the criminality
of conduct is a reason for excluding that conduct if it
would otherwise be relevant and admissible, '¥"igmore
states:
"The well established princple of Multiple Admissibility, applied in numerous ways, declares
that the inadmissibility of an evidential fact for
one purpose does not prevent its admissibility for
any other purpose otherwise proper.*** If there
is any other material or evidential proposition, for
which it is relevant, and if it is offered for that
purpose, it is receivable, and its quality as misconduct or crime does not stand in the way." ('¥"igmore on Evidence, Third Edition, Vol. I, Sec.
216).

1

•

J
1

Wigmore gives two answers to the statement, sometimes
made, that in the case of an accused person, where past
crimes are offered, there is greater danger of abuse and
greater risks of harm in case of abuse:
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"One is dogmatic, that there is no difference in
the rules of evidence for criminals and for civil
cases. The other is practical, that an exception
such as here suggested would handicap the State
in its prosecution of the man of cumulative criminal darmg. The greater the criminal brought to
bar, the more closely the traces of his crime were
involved in other misdeeds, the more stupendorn
his scheme of crime culminating in the act charged, so much the more safe and invulnerable would
he have rendered himself, if the law were ma<le
thereby to lose this evidential material. By every
spot of blood with which he taints the steps of his
criminal progress, he succeeds in increasing the
safety of his new crimes. This is an ample reason,
if no other were even conceivable, for refusing to
make an exception, already antagonistic to principle and obnoxious to practical procedure. 'No
man,' in the neat phrase of l\Ir. Justice Brewer.
'can by multiplying crimes diminish the volumt
of testimony against him.' " (Id.)
Wigmore states this conclusion:
"Now the possibility of the abuse or misapplication of such evidence is no sufficient reason for
making such an exception. This possibility existl
equally for all the other cases above-mentioned:
and it is always open to the opponent, here a~
there, to have the jury fully instructed in the lim
ited purpose and use of the evidence." (Id.)
This Court in State v. Mares, 113 U. 225, 192 P.2d
861, held that a "relevant fact does not become incompe·
tent because it may tend to establish another and separate
crime." See also State v. Pollock, 102 U. 587, 129 P.2d
554; State v. Kappas, 100 U. 274, 114 P.2d 205; and
Abshier t'. People, 87 Colo. 507, 289 Pac. 1081.
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One of the more frequently cited federal cases is
Suhay v. U.S., 95 F.2d 890 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 304
U.S. 580, where the court said:
"It is fundamental that an accused cannot be
convicted upon proof that he committed another
offense; and it is axiomatic that ordinarily evidence of a crime wholly separate, independent,
and without any relation to the one laid in the indictment is not admissible. But relevant evidence
which tends to prove a material fact should not be
excluded merely because it shows or tends to
show that the accused committed another offense
at a different time and place. The test in measuring the admissibility of evidence is whether it is
material to any issue in the case on trial."

See also: JV eeks v. United States, 313 F.2d 688 ( 10 Cir.
1963); Troutman v. United States, 100 F.2d 628 (10
Cir.); and O'Dell t'. United States, 251 F.2d 704 (IO
Cir.).
'Vhat is the relevancy, the materiality, of Osborne's
actions in using the proceeds of the loan, $45,000.00 of it
at least, to try to conceal prior embezzlements? It is reasonable to infer from those actions, which the offered
evidence would establish by clear and convincing proof,
that use of the borrowed money to conceal prior embezzlements was not an afterthought, but was the impelling consideration in every step he took to obtain the loan.
It is an understatement to say that it is merely reasonable
to infer from his actions that he did not deal honestly
with anyone who was concerned with the purpose for
which he sought to borrow the money; with the First Na31

tional Bank in whatever representations he may have
made as to why he needed the money and why Hudson
was willing to co-sign with him or guarantee his note;
with Hudson to whom he made the representation that
he needed Hudson's financial statement in connection
with a proposal that the controlling stock of the Moab
National Bank might be offered for sale; with Hudson
in whatever trick or artifice he employed to obtain Hudson's signature to the loan guaranty agreement without
Hudson's knowledge that he was signing such an instrument; with the b'.mk, of which he was the executive offi.
cer, in failing to comply with federal law ( 12 U.S.C. Sec.
37 5a) requiring him to report to its board of directors in
writing setting out the date and amount of the loan, the
secur:ty therefor, "and the purposes for which the proceeds haYe been or are to be used."
'Ve are reminded of the statement that "Fraud assumes as many and complex forms as the ingenuity of
man is able to deYise." (Peskin 'l'. Squires, 156 C.A.2d
240, 319 P.2d 40.5, 411 (1958)). Also the statement by
Cooley in his work on Torts, 3rd Ed., p. 933:
"The ways of fraud are infinite in their diversity,
and if into any one of them all the law refuses to
follow for the rescue of victims, it will be in the
direction of that one that fraudulent devices will
specifically tend."
Osborne was under a compelling necessity of ob·
taining Hudson's signature on two documents-one a
financial statement, and the other a loan guaranty
agreement. One of the signahires had to be witnessed
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so that the Grand Junction bank could compare that
signature with the signature on the other document. He
concocted a story that he and Hudson might be able
to purchase the controlling stock interest in the Moab
National Bank because the president of the bank was old
and might want to sell out, and that he needed a financial
statement signed by Hudson to have on hand for that
purpose. Hudson had the statement prepared and he
signed it on June 2, 1969, before a witness. The statement was addressed to the ]}foab National Bank and was
delivered to Osborne at the bank on the day it was signed.
Osborne wasted no time in sending the financial statement to the Grand Junction bank. Mackley acknowledged receiving it the next day, June 3, 1969, in a letter
he wrote to Os borne enclosing the promissory note for
Osborne's signature and that of .Mr. Hudson. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2; Defendant's Exhibit No. 28; R.
133).

The offered evidence would justify the following
inferences:
1. That had Hudson knowingly and voluntarily guaranteed such a loan Hudson would naturally have been concerned with what use would be
made of the proceeds of the loan.
2. That Hudson would not have knowingly and
voluntarily signed the loan guaranty agreement
had it been disclosed to him that the purpose of
the loan was to obtain money to conceal prior embezzlements.
3. That, therefore, in order to obtain Hudson's

signature on the guaranty agreement Osborne had
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to trick, defraud and deceive Hudson into signing the document.
The admissibility of the evidence offered to show
Osborne's real purpose in borrowing the money is clearly
allowed by Rule 55 of the Rules of Evidence adopted by
this Court effective July 1, 1971. That Rule provides:
"Subject to Rule 47 [Character Trait as Proof
of Conduct] evidence that a person committed a
crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit
crime or ciYil wrong as the basis for an inference
that he committed another crime or civil wrong on
another occasion but, subject to Rules 45 [Discretion of Judge to Exclude Admissible Evidence] and ~8 [Character Trait for Care or Skill
-Inadmissible to Prove Quality of Conduct}.
such evidence is admisJ.sible when relevant to
prove some other material fact including absence
of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, in·
tent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity."
(Emphasis added.)
The Note to this Rule provides:
"NOTE: The generally accepted rule prohibits
evidence of another crime or civil wrong as proof
that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on
a specified occasion. The things set forth above
are only exemplary and not exclusive."
Evidence as to what Osborne did with the money bears
directly upon his motive, intent, and the plan or scheme
he concocted to borrow the money without disclosing the
loan to either Hudson or the Moab Bank.
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POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO ADMIT IN EVIDENCE THE OFFERED
TESTIMONY OF \\TILLIAM S. MAY RELATIVE TO ADl\IISSIOXS AND DECLARATIONS
MADE HY OSBORNE.
The following testimony by William S. May relating to a conversation he had with Osborne in April or
May of 1970 when the Moab Bank was being examined
by bank examiners, and just after Osborne had come out
of a meeting of the board of directors, was offered by
counsel for defendant Hudson but rejected by the court:
"The statement he made at that time was to the
effect, well I might as well tell you about it, you'll
know about it anyway. I asked what he meant,
and he said there was an unlisted loan at the First
National Bank in the amount of sixty thousand
dollars. * * * And I never thought too much about
it one way or another, and I asked him how the
loan come about and he said that Jim Hudson
guaranteed the loan. And he said, that I finally
was able to hang one in him. I've been laying for
him for some time and I finally got the chance to
do it. And that was about the extent of the conversation." (R. 108)
In that statement Osborne admitted that the
$60,000,00 loan obtained by him from the First National
Bank was unlisted and that he had failed to comply with
the requirement offederal statute Section 375a, Title 12,
United States Code. As we have noted, that statute required Osborne to report the loan in writing to the board

35

of directors of the .Moab bank and advise them of the
amount and date of the loau, security and "the purposes
for which the proceeds have been or are to be used." The
inference that would have been established by the evi.
dence discussed under Point I-that Osborne had failed
to report the loan to the board of directors-would be·
come an admitted fact under the testimony of May. The
inference that rea2'onably could be made from the offered
evidence d;scussed under Point I - that Osborne could
not have dealt honestly and forthrightly with Hudson
and was forced to deceive Hudson and conceal from hiru
the fact that Osborne ·was seeking a loan for money to
be used to cover prior embezzlements-is supported and
made stronger by his admission that he had been "laying
for" Hudson and finally was able to "hang one in him."
l\Ioreover, the admissions of Osborne to :May disclosed
malice toward Hudson from which an intent to defraud
could be inferred.
A general statement of the exception to the hearsay
rule which permits the receipt in evidence of admissiom
against interest is found in 29 Am .J ur 2d, Sec. 600:
"The hearsay rule, in general renders inadmis.
sible in evidence unsworn statements made out oJ
court offered as proof of the facts asserted. How
ever, the admissions of a party made directly b)
him, or through his agent duly authorized to speak
for him, or by a privy, relative to the subject mat·
ter of a suit, are admissible in evidence againsl
such party where they are inconsistent with tht
daim he asserts in the action, whether he is the
plaintiff or the defendant, and whether or not ht
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is available as a witness. Any statement made by
a party to an action which is against his own interest and which, in its nature, tends to establish
or disprove any material fact, or alleged material
fact, in the case, is competent to be put in evidence
against him in the trial of that action. The fact
that an admission is made by a party prevents it
from being classed as ordinary hearsay, it being
said in some instances that such admissions are not
hearsay at all. The real reason why admissions of
a party may be used as proof of his opponent's
case is not that the utterance is against the interest
of the speaker, but that the law holds everyone
responsible for what he says to the extent that his
sayings may be used as evidence against himself
of the truth of what he has said. An admission of
a party to an action of ten gives the best interpretation of a matter in issue. * * *"
The following exception to the hearsay rule is set
out in Rule 63 ( 10) of the Rules of Evidence adopted
by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah effective
July 1, 1971:
" ( 10) Declarations Against Interest. Subject
to the limitations of exception ( 6), a statement
which the judge finds was made by a declarant
who is unavailable as a witness and which was at
the time of the assertion so far contrary to the declarant' s pecuniary or proprietary interest or so
far subjected him to civil or criminal lia~ility or
so far rendered invalid a claim by him agamst another or created such risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule or social disapproval t~at
the declarant under the circumstances existmg
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true;"
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The admissibility of admissions against interest, of
course, is determined by the Court. According to further
statements in said Section 600 the "courts necessarily
have latitude in determining the admissibility of such
evidence" and admission or rejection should be determined with a view to all the facts and circumstances of
the case and the rules of law governing admissibility of
such evidence. In Section 602 of 29 Am J ur 2d it is
stated that an admission against interest, like all other
evidence, is admissible only if it is relevant to issues in
the case. Admissions of a party which are relevant to the
issues are admissible notwithstanding the transaction to
which they refer, or out of which thE'y rise, is not itself
related to the issue before the Court.
It is also said that admissions or declarations, to be
competent, must have been expressed in definite, certain
and unequivocal language, and should not be in the fonn
of conclusions, opinions, or understandings acquired by
the witness from unexplained acts or words of the declarant. ( 29 Am J ur 2d Sec. 604)

The trial court in ruling on the offered evidence
commented that he thought it was vague and susceptible
to many interpretations. Later he amplified his ruling in
these words :
"THE COURT: Well, I might just take one
or two moments here and amplify my ruling on
the witness that was just excused. I had the court
reporter again read his testimony and it was as I
had remembered it. He starts it out by saying that
Osborne told him that Hudson had guaranteed
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the loan and he said I've been laying for him a
loug time, I finally got him. Now to clarify my
ru1mg it is this. I contend I don't know whether
he meant that he, he said that he guaranteed the
loan, I don't know whether he meant he guaranteed the loan, I cant pay it, he's going to have to
pay it, that would be hanging one on him. He
didn't use the words I practiced fraud on him to
get him to sign or I hung one on him by getting
him to sign or that he didn't know what he was
signing. He prefaced it by saying he guaranteed
the loan. I finally hung one on him. And I don't
know what he meant by that remark, whether,
you see, whether he meant he's going to have to
pay it because I can't pay it. That would be hanging one on him, but I noted particularly and I had
the reporter as I said read it over to me word for
word again. He didn't say I hung one on him by
getting him to sign it and he didn't know what he
was doing, or practicing artifice on him or slight
of hand or some ruse. This is after he got him to
sign he hung one on him. To me it may mean that
he is simply going to have to pay this. This is
hanging one on him you see, so that is the reason
that I ruled as I did. I wanted to clarify it. All
right, when I said it was vague that's what I
meant." (R. 111-112)
When asked if he could remember words used by
Osborne, May replied that he could not remember "it
happened so long ago" and "that is the substance of it,
but they are my words." ( R. 109)
We submit that May's testimony as to what Osborne said does not disclose the vagueness, uncertainty
and susceptibility to many interpretations that the trial
court found. Osborne told May:
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I. There was an unlisted loan for $60,000.00
with the First National Bank in Grand Junction.
There is nothing unclear, indefinite or vague
about that.

2. Hudson had guaranteed it-a simple, clear,
unambiguous statement.
3. He had been "laying for him for some time"
and finally was able to "hang one in him." These
are uneqmvocal and descriptive statements of Osborne's ill will and malice toward Hudson, and
when they are considered, for admissibility, "with
a view to all the facts and circumstances of the
case" and with the "latitude" extended to the
court" in determining the admissibility of such
evidence," ( 29 Am J ur 2d Sec. 600) it is not unreasonable to conclude that Osborne actually was
gloating over his success in the cleverest step in
his scheme-that of getting Hudson's signature
on the loan guaranty agreement without his
knowledge that he was signing such an instrument.

If .May had quoted Osborne as saying "I practiced
fraud on him to get him to sign,'' or that in getting him to
sign he was "practicing artifice on him or slight of hand
or some ruse" the trial court would have had good basis
for refusing to receive such conclusions, opinions or understandings acquired by the witness from unexplained
acts or words of the declarant. ( 29 Am J ur 2d Sec. 604)
'Ve submit that :May's testimony relative to the admissions and declarations made by Osborne was admissible under Rule 63 ( 10) of the Rules of Evidence. That
Osborne was unavailable appears from the following:

'"l'HE CO UR'l': Could I ask you this? This
ha_s bothered me. Why hasn't someone taken Osborne's deposition?
"l\IR. SAPERSTEIN: They attempted to
and he didn't appear.
"MR. JENSEN: We noticed him, we tried to
get him.
"THE COURT: Seems to me he could shed
a lot of light on many of these things.
"MR. JENSEN: We tried to get him but his
attorney wouldn't produce him. He has left the
state." (R. 189)
Osborne's statements to May disclosed malice toward
Hudson from which an intent to defraud could be inferred, and they "·ere so far against his interest as to
make them admissible under Rule 63 (IO).

III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO RECEIVE IN EVIDENCE EXPERT OPINION THAT _MACKLEY DID NOT CONFORl\'1
TO THE STANDARDS OF AN ORDINARY
PRUDENT BANKER OR TO REASONABLE
COMMERCIAL STANDARDS IN THE BANKING BUSINESS.
Counsel for defendant Hudson offered in evidence
the expert opinions of John M. Chatelain, Senior Examiner for the Utah Department of Financial Institutions, in charge of all examinations of banks, credit institutions, finance compames and savings and loan
-H

associations in the state ( R. 179) as to whether the
conduct of .Mackley in making the loan of $60,000.00
to Osborne was conduct of an ordinary prudent banker
or whether that conduct conformed with reasonable
commercial standards in the banking business. Mr.
Chatelain's answers to hypothetical questions asked by
counsel were as follows:
"A. I feel that he did not act in accordance with
the conduct of completing a file in a prudent
manner in this particular assumed situation." ( R.
197)

"A. That he did not conform to the reasonably
acceptable standard of commercial lending." (R.
198)

In answer to a question as to what Mackley should have
done in making the loan had he acted as an ordinary
prudent banker, Mr. Chatelain stated:
"A. A definite contact should have been made
with the, Mr. Hudson. Since the loan was obviously going to be made on the basis of his guarantee. His file should have been complete, completely documented in writing showing that a contact had been made preferably in person, but had
he made the contact and knew of his own certainty that he was talking to Mr. Hudson then
backed it up by documentation such as a credit
report in writing or a memorandum that contact
had been made through the credit bureau. In other
words, complete a file on this borrower since he
was unknown to the bank. Aud since also that this
amount was considerably in excess of what had
been usually transacted or loans made to Mr. Osborne." (R. 199)
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Mr. Chatelain also testified that his answer would be
the same if the question were asked 'Vhat should Mr.
Mackley have done prior to disbursing these funds to
Osborne, if he had acted in accordance with reasonable
commercial standards of the banking business. (R. 199)
Through questions to Mr. Chatelain counsel
brought out the following bearing upon his qualifications:
He had been with the State Bank Commission
or the Department of Financial Institutions for
ten years and seven months. (R. 190)
He had been in the banking business nearly
twenty two years before he went with the State
Uank Commission.
Before he was employed by the Department of
Financial Institutions he was engaged as a private banker with the Union Bank and Trust Co.
for nearly twenty-two years. (R. 191)
While at that bank he was engaged in making
loans of all kinds-installment loans, real estate
loans, commercial loans, servicing loans for institutional investors; and in hiring, training and
supervising bank personnel. ( R. 192)
That as a result of his contacts with representatives of the F.D.I.C. and joint examinations conducted with them he had become acquainted with
generally accepted and reasonable commercial
practices and standards throughout the nation,
and that he was not aware of anv differences in
such standards and practices froni one federal reserve district to another. (R. 193)
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Under questioning by the trial court Mr. Chatelain
testified that he was familiar with nationally accepted
standards. The Court then stated:

'"l'HE COURT: 'Yell, I think that if he can
establish a banking standard he can tell whether
or not this practice conforms to the standard, I
believe. Unless you cau convince me otherwise.
"That do you say about that?" ( R. 183)
After discussion by counsel the Court further interrogated the witness as follows:
"THE COUR 'l': Isn't there a lot of discretion
placed in the individual banker whether a loan
should be made or not ?

"A. Yes.
"THE COURT: Don't a lot of bankers look
at a man and say, I think you're a, you're good
for it without investigation?
''A.

'iV e discourage that.

"THE COURT: ''rel!, they do it don't they?

"A. Right. I have to admit that.
"THE COURT: Character loan, depends on
who the man is doesn't it?
"A. Right. He should be known to the bank
officer, bank officials. He should be able to back
up loans he made without specific authority by a
file.
"THE COURT: Under the question given
you, thz~ hypothetical questiou asked you it would
mean just about, if any loan went sour, wasn't
paid, the banker was negligent wouldn't it?
"A. Not necessarily. nut h;s loan
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comm~ttee

or

his superiors would determine if he followed a
procedure that they had charged him with m
order to make that loan." (R. 186-187)
The Court announced his decision as follows:
"THE COURT: I think my mind is made up,
as Judge Keller used to say. No need for any
more argument. It appears to me that this, we are
making a very complicated case I think of something that to me is relatively simple. Number 1,
did Hudson sign the loan agreement? I think that
has been established. Number 2, was any fraudulent misrepresentation made to get him to sign the
agreement? That is the other proposition. If so,
assuming that there were such, the next is, did the
bank, the Plaintiff bank have knowledge thereof
or was it put on notice that he was imposed upon
for the purpose of obtaining his signature on the
loan guaranty agreement. That is all I see to this
case. Very simple proposition. Now here it seems
to be we are trying to show despite the fact that
there is no uniformity in making loans, despite the
fact that a great deal of discretion is vested in the
loan officer who makes the loan, we are trying to
judge whether or not Mr. Mackley acted prudently in making this loan. And to the Court it
does not appear that is the real issue. The real
issue is whether or not 1\fr. l\1acklev or the bank
had knowledge of any imposition b~ing practiced
upon the Defendant to obtain the loan if such
were done. And I don't believe that this testimony
goes to prove or tend to prove that issue. Hence I
think I shall sustain the objection." ( R. 188)
After the off er of proof was made by putting hypothetical questions to Mr. Chatelain the Court made the
following additional comments as to his ruling:
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"THE COURT: I want to add the reason
that the testimony of Mr. Chatelain was not received by the Court, I want to make a record on
that. In that the Court feels that it is irrelevant as
to whether or not prudent practice was followed
with respect to the liability of the Defendant
Hudson on the guaranty. The Court is of the
opinion that if he were to rule that every time a
banker acted imprudently or not reasonably in
making a loan and had a guaranty that that loan
or guaranty would be questionable and that
would upset our whole commercial practice. If we
are going to say now here is a guaranty or here is
a co-signed note I wonder if the banker who made
that loan or the loan officer acted prudently or
reasonably? If he didn't, we have made, left a perfact defense for the defendant to come in and say
the banker shouldn't have made that loan, therefore the co-signer or guarantor should be released
from his liability. And I don't think that is the
issue here. I think the sole issue here is whether or
not there was an imposition practiced upon Mr.
Hudson to get his signature to that loan guaranty
agreement and whether the bank had notice thereof." (R. 201)
A. GIVEN THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES
UNDER 'VHICH MACKLEY l\1ADE THIS
LOAN, AN ORDINARY PRUDENT BANKER
WOULD HA VE MADE INQUIRY OF HUDSON. ACCORDINGLY, MACKLEY 'VAS PUT
ON A DUTY OF INQUIRY AND CHARGEABLE 'VITH NOTICE OF ALL SUCH INQUIRY WOULD DISCLOSE.
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'l'he question put by the trial court-whether the
bank had notice of Osborne's fraud-is the very question to which the proffered testimony was directed, because .Mackl:ey's conduct as a reasonable prudent
banker bears upon the question of whether he is chargeable with notice of the imposition upon Hudson.
As demonstrated elsewhere in this brief, the bank's
notice is germane if Hudson is found to have been
negligent in signing the guaranty. If Hudson was not
negligent then he has a complete defense on the basis
of fraud in f actum regardless of lack of notice to the
bank.
If it is assumed, argnendo, that Hudson was neg-

ligent in signing the loan guaranty agreement, which
defendant Hudson strenuously denies, the question
raised by the trial court, whether Mackley had notice
of the fraud, is presented. In speaking of the "notice"
here involved this Court in J ungk v. Holbrook, 15
Utah 198, 49 Pac. 305, stated that it "does not mean
actual and direct information. If a party is put upon
inquiry as to a particular fact, then he is charged in
law with whatever inquiry will disclose." In IO Williston on Contracts, (3rd Ed. Jaeger, 1967) sec. 1248,
p. 791, it is stated as follows:
"Of course, if the creditor at the time when he
took the contract was chargable with notice of the
principal's deception or compulsion or did not
give value for the obligation, the surety, on ordinary equitable principals is excused."
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In 38 Am. J ur. 2nd, Guaranty, sec. 59, p. 1061, it is
stated that '"Knowledge on the part of the creditor as
to the imposition practiced on the guarantor may be
imputed from his knowledge of other facts."
It is submitted that .Mackley was put upon inquiry,
and that he is charged with what that inquiry would
have disclosed. If he had personally contacted Hudson
he would have learned that Hudson knew nothing about
the proposed loan, was not a ware of ever signing the
loan guaranty agreement, and had no intention of guaranteeing a loan to Osborne. The issue of whether
Mackley, the banker, was charged with a duty of inquiry
must of necessity be determined by reference to whether
a reasonable prudent banker would have made inquiry
under the same circumstances. This was felt to be a
matter properly for expert testimony. The assumed
facts were weighed by Mr. Chatelain and from them
he concluded that had :1\-iackley acted as a prudent
banker would have acted, and had Mackley acted in
conformity to reasonable commercial standards, he
would have made inquiry of Hudson. Those facts were:
Mackley did not know Hudson or anything about
him and except for one purported and unsuccessful effort to reach him by telephone Osborne did
nothing to reach Hudson to verify the loan guaranty agreement.
l\iackley did not get a credit report on Hudsoneither oral or written.
Mackley asked Osborne to furnish Hudson's fi.
nancial statement. The statement furnished by
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Osborne was addressed to the 1lloab bank, not the
Grand Junction Bank.
Hudson's signature on his financial statement
was witnessed. His signature on the Loan Guaranty Agreement was not witnessed though the
form used had a line for a witness to sign on .
.Mackley sent the promissory note to Osborne for
his signature and the signature of Hudson. Instead, Osborne substituted the loan guaranty
agreement.
The blank for information as to where the loan
guaranty agreement had been signed was not
completed. :Mackley had the blank completed to
falsely show that it had been signed in Grand
Junction. Similarly, Mackley added material to
a blank to provide that the agreement should be
construed according to the law of Colorado.
Osborne's financial statement furnished to Mackley showed a net worth of about $16,600.00, and
that his salary was $15,600.00 a year. 'Vhile Osborne and his wife had borrowed from the Grand
Junction Bank before they had never borrowed
more than $3,500.00.
Mackley did not consult with the loan committee
of his bank about the loan, and he testified that he
had no recollection of consulting with any other
officer of that bank before disbursing the money
to Osborne.

B. IF lVIACKLEY'S CONDUCT DID NOT CONFORM TO REASONABLE COMlVIERCIAL
STANDARDS IN THE BANKING BUSINESS,
THE BANK SHOULD BE DENIED RECOVERY UPON THE PRINCIPLE EXPRESSED
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IN SECTION
AMENDED.

70A-3-406,

U.C.A.,

1953, AS

In 1965 the Utah Legislature adopted the uniform
commercial code, Article 3, Sec. 406, of which became
Section 70A-3-406 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953
as amended. That section provides:
)

"Any pers.on who by his negligence substan.
tially contributes to a material alteration of the
instrument or to the making of an unauthorized
signature is precluded from asserting the alteration or lack of authority against a holder in due
course or against a drawee or other payor who
pays the instrument in good f a.ith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of
the drawee's or payor's business." (Emphasis
added.)
In the case of Gresham State Bank v. 0 and K Construction Company, (1962) 231 Or. 106, 370 P.2d 726,
the above statutory provision, which had been adopted in
Oregon was relied upon. The court held that in cashing
checks payable to a construction company, and endorsed by its office manager and bookkeeper to whom
the cash was delivered, the party cashing the checks
did not make payment of the checks in accordance with
reasonable commercial standards of its business, and
therefore the construction company could assert lack
of authority of its office manager against such party
even though the construction company's negligence
substantially contributed to the unauthorized endorsement of the checks. The facts in the case were that
McKenna, office manager for 0 and K Construction
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Co. placed unauthorized endorsements on checks received and payable to the construction company (by the use
of a rubber stamp as to the name of the company followed by his name as "office manager" or "Bkpr") and
cashed them at Zimmerman's store, receiving in cash
the full amounts of the checks. The court held that while
the officers of the construction company were not
seriously at fault, in not discovering McKenna's deception, their conduct could be regarded as negligence, and
the court held that Zimmerman was also at fault. In
determining who should bear the loss the court concluded that the quoted section of the uniform commercial code expressed the appropriate principle. The court
said:
"'Ve begin with the well established rule that
one who obtains possession of a check through
the unauthorized endorsement of the payee's
name acquires no title to it and is liable to the
payee for the amount of the check unless the
payee is precluded from setting up the want of
authority. * * *
"It seems evident that the 0 and K Construction Company's negligence was a causal factor
contributing to the forgery. Each of the parties
had a duty to exercise due care in connection with
the checks in question. Each failed to perform its
duty. The question is how to allocate the loss under such circumstances. The conduct of each
could be described in terms of negligence. Applying the accepted rule in other negligence cases,
the defendant construction company would be
barred from recovery because of its contributory
negligence. But, it is not necessary or desirable to
extend the doctrine of contributory negligence be-
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yond its present scope and there are special reason!' why we should not do so in the la'v of commercial paper.
"The pattern for decision in cases such as the
one before us is found in Sec. 3-406 of the Uniform Commercial Code which was adopted by the
enactment of Oregon Laws 1961, Ch. 726, Sec.
73.4060, to be effective on September 1, 1963

***

"Although this section is not operative until
September 1, 1963, it expresses the legislatire
view as of the time of its enactment. There is no
existing Oregon statute or adjudicated case which
announces a contrary principle. As we ha Ye already indicated the cases in other jurisdictions are
in conflict. 'Ve are, therefore, free to adopt the
principle which, in our opinion, will comport with
the needs of the business community in dealing
with commercial paper under circumstances such
as we have here. 'Ve believe that Section 3-406 of
the Uniform Commercial Code expresses the appropriate principle. 'Ve therefore adopt it. 'Ve
believe that it is particularly appropriate to do so
because it conforms to the view taken, at least
tentatively, by the 1961 Legislative Assembly in
adopting Oregon Laws 1961, Ch. 726, with a postponed effective date.
"It is apparent that this section requires a
weighing process in choosing between the owner
of the forged instrument and the payor in allocating the loss. Translating the section in terms of
the factual situation before us, the 0 and K Construction Company is not precluded from asserting McKenna's lack of authority unless two conditions exist: ( 1 ) that 0 and K Construction
Company's negligence 'substantially contributes
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to the making of the unauthorized signature', and
( 2) Zimmerman made payment on the instrument
in good faith 'and in accordance ·with the reasonable commercial standards of the * * * payor's
business.' "
After taking judicial notice of the duty of Zimmerman
to inquire as to .McKenna's authority to make the endorsements, judicially recognized in many cases, the
Court said:
"In the ordinary case it seems proper that the
negligent payor, rather than the negligent principal, should bear the loss caused by an agent's
unauthorized endorsement of his principal's
check. An important factor supporting this conclusion is the relative ease with which the payor,
having knowledge of the agency, can ascertain
the agent's authority, as compared with the difficulty with which an employee's dishonesty may be
detected by his employer. The employer must
overcome the obstacles which the employee devises for the very purpose of making it difficult
to detect the defalcations. Certainly under the circumstances of the present case, it was more reasonable for the officers of the 0 and K Construction Company to assume that their employee was
honest than it was for Zimmerman to assume that
he had the authority to endorse checks and receive
payment in cash for no ostensible corporate purpose. * * *
"We hold that, under the circumstances, Zimmerman cannot rely upon the Construction Company's negligence to bar the latter's recovery. We
reach this conclusion upon a de novo examination
of the record, this being a proceeding in equity.
The same conclusion would be permissible had
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this been an action at law because, as we have in.
dicated, Zimmerman's failure to act in accordance
with reasonable commercial standards can be de.
dared as a matter of law."
See also, 38 Colo. Law Rev. ( 1965) pp. 46, 47. Com.
pare, Park State Bank v. Arena Auto Auction, 207
N.E. 2nd.158 (Ill.1965).
Although the facts of the instant case relate to a
fraudulently obtained signature on a separate loan
guaranty agreement, not an endorsement of a nego.
tiable promissory note, the guaranty was specifically
received for one transaction only, evidenced by the negotiable promissory note of the primary obligor, Osborne.
Moreover, on principle, the two situations are identical.
Here, the plaintiff bank, in substance and effect, in
part contends and the trial court, in effect, found as
a matter of law, that, even assuming fraud, Hudson,
"by his negligence substantially contributed" . . . to
the making of what is tantamount to an unauthorized
signature. That accordingly, "he is precluded from
asserting . . . the lack of authority" against the bank.
However, since the effective date of the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code (January 1, 1966) , it is the declared
policy of the State of Utah that this conclusion follows
only if the instrument is paid in good faith and in "accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of
.
"
... payor ' s busmess.
Moreover, since we are not dealing directly with
a negotiable instrument, but a guaranty running directly to the bank, application here of the principle an-
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nounce<l above will create less of an impediment to the
free flow of commercial paper than the literal application of the statute to negotiable instruments.
That this statute comports with the needs of the
business community in dealing with commercial paper
of all kinds and should therefore, be applied to the
instant case is well illustrated by certain salient facts
that evolved below. As in the Gresham case, supra,
it was a matter of relative ease for .Mackley to have
verified the guaranty with Hudson. On the other hand,
Hudson, as the unknowing victim of a fraud, was obviously powerless to prevent the payment by the bank
to Osborne. The more clever the ruse, the more difficult
to detect, the more helpless was Hudson's position.
Contrasted to Hudson's helplessness, Mackley, the
banker, was in total control of the transaction-able
to prevent the loss to the bank by exerting no more
effort than is required to make one phone call.
Can it be said, therefore, that Mackley's failure to
act was in accordance with reasonabl~ commerc,al
standards? It is submitted that his failure to act was
so blatant that the court, as in the Gresham case, supra,
would be justified in declaring it imprudent as a matter
of law. Lest there be any question, however, that this
was a matter for expert testimony, defendant elicited
and proffered the expert opinoin of the witness Chatelain, whose testimony was erroneously excluded by the
trial court.
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IV
'VHETHER HUDSON V\TAS NEGLIGENT IN
SIGNING THE LOAN GUARANTY 'VAS A
JURY QUESTION.
One of the pivotal issues in this litigation is whether
Hudson was negligent in signing the loan guaranty
agreement. This defendant recognizes that the defense
of fraud in the factum as to third parties without notice
is limited to those instances where the victim is free
from negligence. "'here the Yic~im is fre~ from negligence, however, fraud in the factum constitutes a complete defense to the claim of an innocent third party.
The general rule is stated in 'Villiston on Contracts, (3rd Ed., Jaeger, 1967), Vol. 10, Sec. 1248,
as follows:
"A creditor, who has in good faith given value
for the surety's promise, cannot be denied the
right to enforce it because of fraud ... on the part
of the principal in securing the surety's signature
unless the fraud . . . is of such character as to
make totally void a writing obtained thereby."
In Section 1488, Vol. 12, the same author states:
"Fraud may induce a person to assent to do something which he would not otherwise have done, or
it may induce him to believe that the act which he
does is something other than it actually is. In the
first case, the act of the defrauded person is operative though voidable; in the second case, the
act of the defrauded person is void, because he
does not know he is doing, and does not intend, to
do, this act.
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"This distinction most commonly arises in the
law of negotiable paper. It originated, however,
in the law of sealed instruments and is still of general application. Where a person is fraudulently
induced to sign or endorse a bill or note in the reasonable belief that he is signing something else, he
cannot really be said to have made or endorsed
the bill or note; hence, the ancient plea of non est
factum is applicable. He is in effect stating that
this is not his contract; in fact, it is not a contract
at a 1l. .,
In the Restatement of Contracts, Vol. 2, Sec. 47 5,
the rule is stated in the comment as follows:
".Fraud or misrepresentation may cause a person
to do or to agree to do something that otherwise
he would not have done or agreed to do. This is
the typical case, and such a transaction is only
voidable. But a person may also believe that his
act is not a manifestation or assent to any transaction, or if a manifestation of assent to any transaction, to one entirely different from that which
would have been created had there been no mistake. It is to such a case that the rule stated in the
Section relates. The rule is here confined to cases
where the mistaken belief is camed by misrepresentation, fraudulent or innocent, though not necessarily of a party to the transaction in question;
but mistake of the same character if unaccompanied by negligence of the mistaken party also
precludes the existence of a contract or a discharge. It is only where the erroneous belief is
justifiable that the rule governing fraud or mistake is applicable. A person is not within either
rule who draws an unnatural or negligent inference as to the nature of an act."
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As stated in the Restatement, the law appears to
be that it is only in those instances where the signer
of the writing was himself negligent in so signing,
that he may be estopped from asserting the fraud as
against an innocent third person who has given value
therefor, did not participate in the fraud and is not
chargeable with notice thereof. See also 22 Am. J ur.,
Fraud and Deceit, Sec. 171, p. 984. In 37 Am. J ur.
2nd, Fraud and Deceit, Sec. 269, p. 359, the general
rule is stated as follows:
"According to the prevailing view, the general
rule that failure to read or have a contract read to
a party thereto before signing it precludes him
from complaining about its contents does not
apply in the case of fraud or misrepresentation.
Thus, it is very often held that the instrument
may be avoided where its execution is obtained
by a misrepresentation of its contents so that the
party signs a paper he did not know he was signing, and did not really intend to sign, even though
he had an opportunity to read the pa per, or have
it read to him, and did not do so. This is particularly true where the circumstances are such that
the defrauded person has reason to rely upon the
representations_made to him. Thus, especially in
a case between the original parties, where one is
fraudulently misled as to the contents of the
paper which he signs without reading, he is not
estopped by his negligence from setting up the
fraud, as he might be after third parties have
acted upon it."
In Johnson v. Allen, 158 P.2d 134 (Utah 1945)
this Court reaffirmed its earlier position and without
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limiting its statement of the law to the immediate parties
to the contract lays down the following general proposition:
"The better view seems to be that a person will
be given relief from fraud even though he failed
to read the contract before signing if he was by
some act or artifice induced to refrain from reading it, or if because of the circumstances he was
justified in relying on the representations made."
See also Bennett v. Bowen, 238 Pac. 240, 243 (Utah,
1925); Bancredit, Inc. v. Bethea, 68 N.J. Super. 62,
172 A.2d 10 ( N .J .1961) ; and Anno. 160 A.L.R. 1295.
In Bancredit, Inc. v. Bethea, supra, the court points
out that where a person fully intends to bind himself
on a commercial promissory instrument, he is under a
duty to exercise the highest degree of care. 'Vhere, however, the signer does not intend to evidence a legal obligation, he is under a lesser duty of care.
Here, Hudson's undisputed testimony establishes
that he did not realize that he was signing a commercial
document. He was misled into believing that he was
signing some kind of a paper relating to his waiver of
interest on certificates of deposit cashed prior to the
end of the 90-day period for which they were issued.
Hudson's contact with Osborne was with an apparently
trusted and responsible officer of the l\:loab National
Bank in his capacity as an officer of that bank concerning a matter in which that officer had no personal
interest. Can it be said as a matter of law that under
such circumstances Hudson failed to act as an ordinary
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prudent man in unwittingly signing the guaranty? w·e
submit that it may not and that the trial court erred
in taking that issue from the jury.

v
THE TRIAL COCRT ERRED IN DIRECTING
A VERDICT FOR PLAINTIFF.
Summary judgmeut is a drastic remedy and must
be supported by evidence, admissions and inferences
which, when viewed in the light most favorable to, in
this case, defendant Hudson, shows that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the Grand
Junction bank is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. That test was laid down by this Court in Bullock
v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 U2d 1, 354
P.2d 559, with the further admonition:
"Such showing must pr2clude al! reasonable
possibility that the loser could, if given a trial,
produce eYidence \vhich would reason<tbly sustain a judgment in his favor."
·
This court, in another case, Lund v. Phillips Petroleum
Company, 10 U2d 276, 351 P.2d 952, stated the test
to determine the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a
verdict as follows:
"One nf the chief merits of the~ jury system is
that it brings together a group of perscns representin~ a cross-section of the communitv and
takes advantage of the:r differences in po.int of
view and obtains the benefit of their composite
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--judgment. It is obviously necessary to allow
some latitude for the orbit within which reasonable minds m'ly operate. To be sustainable in
law the verdict need onlv fall within that orbit
so that it can be said that there is substantial
evidence from which reasonable minds could
believe facts which will support it. Applying
that principle here: even though the evidence
was not such as to oblige the jury to find in accordance with the plaintiffs' claims, it seems
hardly open to question that they could, within
the limits of reason, have believed as they did ... "

In Newton v. Oregon Short Line RR. Co., 43
Utah 219, 134 P. 567, 570, Justice Frick made the following statement which has been quoted with approval
in later Utah cases:

" * * * unkss the question of negligence is free
from doubt, the court cannot pass upon it as a
<Juestion of law; that is, if after considering all
the evidence and the inferences that may be deduced therefrom the court is in doubt whether
reason:i ble men, in viewing and C'Onsidering all
the evidence, might arrive at different conclusions. then this very doubt determines the question to be orie of fact for the jury and not one
of law for the court. The court can nass uoon
the question of negligence only in clear cdses.
All others should be submitted to the jury. The
reason of this is apparent from the fact that in
this state all questions of fact are for the jury:
and therefore, unless it is clear that in viewing
and considering the evidence reasonable minds
might not arrive at different conclusions, the
case should go to the jury."
See also, Sticlde v. Union P .RR. Co., 122 Utah 477,
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251 P.2d 867; Lemmon v. Denver~ Rio Grande fVest.
RR. Co., 9 Ctah 2d 195, 341 P.:2d ~15.

In directing the yerdict for plaintiff bank the trial
court said:
"I appreciate the fact that there has been much
said as to whether or not the loan officer*** Mr.
Mackley, did all he could do or acted reasonably
or prudently by not*** notifying Mr. Hudson
about the loan guaranty agreement. * * * It is
true that others in the banking busi,ness could ver:y
well say more should have been done. Others likely also would say that he did not act as a reasonable and prudent man. I am satisfied we could get
opinions on both sides.***" (R. 260-207) (Emphasis added. )
If, as the court said was the case, persons in the banking
business would differ on the question whether Mackley
should have contacted l\Ir. Hudson to inquire about his
execution of the loan guaranty agreement, that issue was
one for the jury. The court also expressed the view that
Mackley's close business relationship with Osbornethough "Admittedly a case of misplaced confidence."justified Mackley's complete reliance upon what Osborne told him relative to the loan guaranty agreement
and relieved him of his duty to make inquiry of Hudson.
On the question whether Osborne defrauded Rud·
son the court said the jury would "have to indulge in a
great many conjectures, inferences or speculations" to
try to determine the circumstances under which Hudson
signed the agreement, and that it would be difficult for
the jury to "pinpoint any particular alleged fraud." In
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the case of Peskin v. Squires, 156 C.A. 2d 240, 319 P.2d
405, the California court made the following observations relative to fraud cases:
"Fraud assumes as many and complex forms
as the ingenwty of man is able to devise. Rarely
can it be proved by direct evidence; usually, as
here the plaintiff must establish his cause of
ac:tion by circumstantial ev:dence, if at all. Trial
judges ~hould be sensitiYe to the fact that a trial
is a search for the truth and because of the
nature of a fraud action liberality in the receipt
of evidence should be indulged to a degree commensurate with the difficulties of the proof.
* * * [citation of cases] 24 Am . .J ur. Sec. 28L
p. 126: 'A court in looking for proof of fraud
is not confined to "wide open spaces" or detailed
proof of fixed and definite overt acts or conduct.
Facts of triflling importance when considered
separately, or slight circumstances trivial and
inconclusiYe in themselves, may afford clear evidence of fraud when considered in connection
with each other. It has been said that in most cases
fraud can be made out only by a concatenation
of circumstances, many of which in themsekes
amount to very little but in connection with others
make a strong case."
Three observations should be made to the noted
statements of the trial court: they appear to be exaggerated; issues are not to be taken from the jury merely because they are difficult to resolve; and the evidence offered but rejected, as to the true purpose Osborne had
in getting the loan-to cover up prior misappropriations
from the .Moab bank-made it clear that Osborne had to
commit a fraud on Hudson to keep him from learning of
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the loan and, more importantly, obtain his signature
without his knowledge. The rejected eYidence was clear,
precise and indubitable. The trial court's rejection of
that evidence was prejudicial error. At the very outset
of the trial, after the jury had been impaneled and sworn,
but out of the presence of the jury, the trial court expressed the view that one inference can be built upon another inference only in criminal cases. In taking that position the court rejected the holding of this Court in
State v. Hall, 145 P.2d 494.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's holding that the evidence received
in this case, when viewed in the light most favorable
to Hudson shows no genuine issue as to any material
fact, is not supported by the evidence or applicable
law. The prejudicial rulings of the court on defendant
Hudson's offers of proof and its unjustified directed
verdict for plaintiff, it is respectfully submitted, require
that the judgment below be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
Herschel J. Saperstein
800 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Clinton D. Vernon
414 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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APPENDIX
Counsel for defendant Hudson made the following
offers of proof:
I. Off er of proof relative to dwposition of money

loaned to Osborne; his indictment and plea of
guilty.

"l\IR. SAPERSTEIN: All right, if Your
Honor please, I think we could stipulate for the
record, could we not, Mr. Jensen, that we have
heretofore argued this and rather than formally
call l\lrs. Dohse, Mrs. Margaret Dohse, and having her sworn inasmuch as the nature of her testimony has heretofore been explored with the Court
and the Court ruled yesterday that it would not
be admissible, we can dispense with that formality.
"MR. JENSEN: I would think so.
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: Then if Mrs. Dohse
were called and sworn and were permitted to
testify in this case-"MR. JENSEN: Is she here in the courtroom? (R. ll2)
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: Yes she is here. Or
was here. Oh, yes, there you are. Mrs. Dohse
would testify to the following matters which the
defendant Jim L. Hudson now offers to prove
by virtue of such testimony. That she is the cashier of the Moab National Bank of :Moab, Utah.
That she has in her possession and under her control and supervision the books and records of said
bank. That the books are kept and maintained in
the usual and ordinary course of business of the
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.Moab National Bank. That included among the
books and records kept and maintained in the
usual course of business of the Moab National
Bank is a general ledger sheet relating to the
First National Bank in Grand Junction, the
Plaintiff. That the First National Bank in Grand
Junction is a correspondent, a correspondent
bank for the Moab National Bank. That she has
examined said ledger sheet and is familiar with
the contents thereof, and I presume, Mrs. Dohse,
you have that ledger sheet with you now?
(Lady sitting in the audience: Yes)
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: In response to the
subpoena. May I see those records? That she has
with her present in Court the said ledger sheet and ·
we would propose to make, if we may, a photocopy of that ledger sheet part of the record in
connection with this offer of proof.
"MR. JENSEN: What does the ledger sheet
show?
"THE COURT: I have seen it.
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: The 1edger sheet, she
would testify that the ledger sheet shows a fortyfive thousand dollar debit entry on the 9th day
of June, 1969, and a fifteen thousand dollar debit
entry on the nth of June, 1969.
"MR. JENSEN: What was the first date?
"'l\1R. SAPERSTEIN: 9th day of June
1969.
"MR. JENSEN: And the other one? (R.
113)
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: The other one was
on the 11th day of June, 1969. That is correct is
it not, Mrs. Dohse?
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(Lady sitting in the audience: It is the 9th
day of June and the 11th).
"MR. JENSEN: How much was that first!
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: :Forty-five thousand
dollars. Now you have the original of this ledger
sheet and this copy that you have given me is
true copy of the original is it not?
(Lady s_itting in the audience: It is a true
copy of the original. )
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: That also included
among the books and records kept and maintain in the usual course of business of the Moab
National Bank are certain debit tickets dated
June 9, 1969, and June 10, 1969, noted to the
account of the First National Bank in Grand
Junction. Are those debit tickets included m
this group here?
(Lady sitting in the audience: Yes.)
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: That she has in her
possession each of those debit tickets referred
to. That the debit ticket to the account of the
First National Bank dated June 9, 1969, is in
the amount of forty-five thousand dollars. And
the debit ticket dated June 10, 1969 is in the
amount of fifteen thousand dollars. That on
each of these and there is a notation, approved,
with the letter 0 by it, and on the second debit
ticket dated June 10, 1969 there is a notation,
loan Osborne. That the witness Mrs. Dohse,
would tesitfy that she was personally acquainted
with the Defendant Ralph Osborne. That until
approximately July of 1970 she [sic] was employed as executive vice president of the Moab
National Bank. That she is familiar with the
handwriting of the said Ralph Osborne and that
each of said debit tickets appears to be in his
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handwriting. The witness would further testify
that included among the books and records of
the .Moab National Bank is a credit ticket dated
June 9, 1969, in the amount of forty-five thousand dollars to the account of the certificates of
deposit. Also opposite the word approved on that
credit ticket is- (R. 114)
"MR. JENSEN: What was the date of that
one?
"MR. SAPERSTTEIN: June 9, 1969.
"MR. JENSEN: Thank you.
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: Also opposite the
word approved on that credit ticket is the letter
written out, 0. That also included among those
records kept and maintained in the usual and or- '
dinary course of business of the Moab National
Bank is a general ledger sheet relating to the
time certificates of deposit issued by said Bank.
That :Mrs. Dohse has with her in court today
the original of said ledger sheet. That said ledger
sheet reflects a credit entry in the amount of
forty-five thousand dollars.
"l\i!R. JENSEN: Are you going to offer those
in?
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: Yes, I am going to
make those all part of the offer of proof.
"MR. ANDERSON: You will have to have
them marked.
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: We can mark them
perhaps as an appellate exhibit, Your Honor,
I think that would be appropriate. And inas·
much as Mrs. Dohse has the original here and
has at my suggestion prepared photo copies to
substitute for the original, if you have no objec·
tion we will offer the photo copies.
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".MR. JENSEN: All right. (R 115)
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: lVIrs. Dohse would
further testify that in May of 1970 she was instructed to conduct an investigation and inspection of the accounting records of the Moab National Bank. And was at that time made aware
of the fact that one of the purposes of the inspection and investigation of the records was
by reason of it having been determined that a
loan in the amount of sixty thousand dollars
had been made to Ralph Osborne, one of the
executive officers of the :Moab National Bank
by the First National Bank in Grand Junction
in June of 1969. That as a result of :Mrs. Dohse's
investigation and inspection of the accounting
records of the .Moab National Bank she discovered the various credit and debit entrys and
the credit and debit tickets about which reference has already been made. That during the
course of her inspection of said records and
upon discovering an entry to the credit of the
time certificate of deposit account in the amount
of forty-five thousand dollars on June 9, 1969,
she examined the records of the bank to find
a corresponding debit entry in the certificate of
deposit ledger sheet to offset the credit entry.
She was unable to do so. That accordingly the
witness would testify that she examined all of
the carbon copies retained by the Moab National
Bank of all certificates of deposit issued by the
Moab National Bank from the first day it opened
its doors to the 9th day of June 1969, that a
carbon copy is made and at that time constituted the record of the issuance of the time
certificates of deposit by the bank. That the
time certificates of deposit issued by the bank
are numbered in numerical sequence. That as a
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result of her examination of these carbon copies,
she discovered that there were no carbon copies
of record for time certificates of deposit No.
179, 129 and 75. She would further testify that
subsequent to June IO, 1969 each of said original
certificates of deposit bearing those numbers were,
was redeemed by the Moab National Bank. And
she now has in her possession those certificates of
deposit. Now do we have copies of those here
also? That as appears from the face of each of
those savings certificates, certificate of deposit
No. 129 was in the face amount of fifteen thousand dollars. And was redeemed by the Moab
National Bank from the owner thereof, Anna
Marie Carter on June 26, 1969. That thereafter
certificate of deposit No. 179-(R ll6)
"MR. JENSEN: Twenty-nine.
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: Seventy-nine.
"MR. JENSEN: The first one?
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: The first was twentv·
nine. Seventy-nine the second one. Thereaft~r
certificate of deposit No. 179 in the face amount
of ten thousand dollars was redeemed by the
Moab National Bank from the owner thereof,
Yam pa Valley Electric Association. That cer·
tificate of deposit No. 75 was in the face amount
of twenty thousand dollars and redeemed by the
Moab National Bank from the owner, San Miguel
Power Association, Inc. Just I-n-c. On the 4th
day of November, 1969.
"l\'1R. JENSEN:
Valley?

'Vhen was the Yampa

"MR. SAPERSTEIN: I don't have that
date. I don't know. Do you have that date? It
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was simply renewed and not redeemed. That
also included among the books and records of
the Moab National Bank are three cashier's
checks. Could we have those checks here.
(Counsel now confers with a lady in the audience believed by the reporter to be .Mrs. Dohse.)

( R 117)

".MR. SAPERSTEIN: Three cashier's
checks numbers 23058, 23059 and 23061. In the
amount of five thousand dollars each payable
to Ralph Osborne issued, each of which was
issued on the 10th day of June 1969 and signed
by Ralph Osborne in behalf of the Moab National Bank. That these cashier's checks were
redeemed by the Moab National Bank without
endorsement on June 23, 1969. June 23, 1969.
And July 14, 1969, respectively.
"MR. ANDERSON: What was the date of
those again?
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: The first two that
I gave you of 58 and 59 were redeemed on June

23.

"MR. ANDERSON: I mean the date of the
checks.
":MR. SAPERSTEIN: J uue 10, all of them.
Number 61 was redeemed on July 14. That is
correct is it not?
(Lady sitting in the audience: Yes it is.)
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: Mrs. Dohse, perhaps
you could come forward if you would. You have
enclosed an additional item here. Could you explain what these are.
(Counsel confers with Mrs. Dohse.)
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"_MR. SAPERSTEIN: That Mrs. Dohse
would further testify that each of the persons
previously named purchased their respective
time certificates of deposit, the funds rather than
have been noted as a debit entry to the time certificate of deposit were otherwise diverted and
that she has in her possession registered copies
of the various cashier's checks, all of which are
signed by Ralph Osborne showing where said
funds were diverted. That is, I shouldn't say
showing where said funds were diverted, but
rather showing or representing the funds that
were not credited to the time certificate of deposit ledger. That would conclude her testimony, Your Honor, and as part of the offer
of proof I would, of course, offer as an appellate
exhibit exemplified copy of the indictment in
the case of the United States of America versus
Ralph Osborne. Whereunder there are three
counts of embezzlement relating specifically to
each of the cashiers checks. I should say each
of the time certificates of deposit previously
mentioned, together with an exemplified copy
of the minute entry reflecting the plea of guilty
thereto, and would ask that also be made a part
of the record as an appellate exhibit. (R 118)
"MR. JENSEN: You probably better mark
them.
"_MR. SAPERSTEIN: "Mr.Jensen, do you
have any objection, although this is not part of
Mrs. Dohse's testimony, included among the
documents they turned over to me was a general
ledger sheet. This is from the First National
Bank in Grand Junction and reflects the sixty
thousand dollar"MR. JENSEN: Here?
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"MR. SAPERSTEIN: Yes.
"MR. JENSEN: No, I have no objection.
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: To Ralph Osborne.
I am wondering if perhaps in order to expedite
things we could make these all appellate exhibits and maybe number them after the conclusion of the hearing today?
"THE COURT: Yes, let's do that.
"MR. JENSEN: Yes.
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: That concludes my
offer of proof, Your Honor.
"THE COURT. Do counsel, since l\!lrs. Dohse
is here, do counsel want to ascertain whether
or not that would be her testimony if she were
to testify?
"MR. JENSEN: I think the record would
indicate that Mrs. Dohse nodded in the affirmative that would be her testimony, is that correct,
Mrs. Dohse?
"MRS. DOHSE: Yes, that's right. (R II9)
"THE COURT: And do counsel have any
objection to the, to having her testimony as
counsel has testified she would and as she has
stated she would if she were to take the stand,
do you have any objection to this testimony? I
mean this is on the record, there is nothing to
show yet that you have objected to this testimony.
"MR. JENSEN: Yes, we objected to the
offer. 'Ve objected yesterday to this testimony,
and it was agreed that it come in as an offer of
proof.
"THE COURT: I didn't recall a specific ob-
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jection to .Mrs. Dohse's purported testlinonr
I see.
"
"MR. JENSEN: That's right.
"THE COURT: Very well.
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: Your Honor, just
for the record, she was the only witness that I in.
tended to call to prove the matter to be discussed,
that we discussed yesterday. Perhaps I didn't
mention her by name at the time.
"MR. ANDERSON: So the objection we
made yesterday would apply here to this offer.
"THE COURT: To this testimony, very well.
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: And that objection
was sustained and that is the reason for the offer
made.
"THE COURT: I beg your pardon.
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: And that objection
was sustained, and that is the reason for the offer
of proof just made.
"THE COURT: Very well.
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: That is correct is it
not, Mr. Jensen?
"MR. JENSEN: Yes." (R. II9-I20)
2. Offer of proof relative to conversation of Wil-

liam S. May with Osborne.

Counsel for defendant Hudson made the following
offer of proof by way of questions put by him to William S. May, in the absence of the jury, with reference to
a conversation he had with defendant Osborne in April,
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1970. The questions and .Mr. :May's answers were as fol-

lows:
"Q. Now, .Mr. May, inviting your attention to
the month of May, sometime in the month of May
or perhaps April of 1970, did you at that time
have a conversation with Ralph Osborne?

"A. There were numerous conversations I had
with Ralph. One we were discussing was, primary concern was right at the time we were
being examined by the bank examiners and after
he come out of the board meeting we were sitting
in the coffee lounge having a cup of coffee.
"Q. Who else was present?

"A. No one. Myself and Mr. Osborne. The
statement he made at that time was to the effect,
well I might as well tell you about it, you'll know
about it anyway. I asked him what he meant,
and he said there was an unlisted loan at the
First National Bank in the amount of sixty
thousand dollars.
"Q. First National Bank of what?

"A. First National Bank of Grand Junction.
And I never thought too much about it one way
or another, and I asked him how the loan came
about and he said that Jim Hudson guaranteed
the loan. And he said, that I finally was able to
hang one in him. I've been laying for him for
some time and I finally got the chance to do it.
And that was about the exrent of the conversation that afternoon.
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: I would tender that
also, if Your Honor please, as being a declaration against interest.
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"TIIE COURT: I have serious doubt about
that one.
"lVIR. JENSEN: \Vell, I would object to it
on the ground that it is not a declaration against
interest, it is not material. That it is hearsay.
(R. 108)
"MR. SAPERSTEIN: If Your Honor
please, the statement is that, I think you said,
hang one on him, I think you told me, laying
for him.
"l\IR. JENSEN: Hang one in him. Do you
remember?
"Q. Do you remember what the words were!

"A. No, I cannot, it happened so long ago.
But that is the substance of it, but they are my
words." (R. 109)
The Court sustained the objection on the ground
that "it isn't a declaration against interest, it seems to me
it is a declaration in his interest" and the further ground
that "it is very vague and susceptible it appears to the
Court to many interpretations. Whether he meant he got
him to sign and hung one on him by getting him to sign
the loan guaranty, or what he meant is very vague." (R.
no) After a recess the Court amplified his ruling as
follows:
"THE COURT: Well, I might just take one
or two moments here and amplify my ruling on
the witness that was just excused. I had the court
reporter again read his testimony and it was
as I had remembered it. He starts it out by
saying that Osborne told him that Hudson ~ad
guaranteed the loan and he said I've been laymg
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for him a long time, I finally got him. Now to
clarify my ruling it is this. l contend that I don't
know whether he meant that he, he said that he
guaranteed the loan. I don't know whether he
meant he guaranteed the loan, I can't pay it, he's
going to have to pay it, that would be hanging one
on him. He didnt use the words I practiced fraud
on him to get him to sign or I hung one on him
by getting him to sign or that he didn't know
what he was signing. He prefaced it by saying
he guaranteed the loan. I finally hung one on
him. And I don't know what he meant by that
remark, whether, you see, whether he meant he's
going to have to pay it because I can't pay it.
That would be hanging one on him, but I noted
particularly and I had the reporter as I said
read it over to me word for word again. He
didn't say I hung one on him by getting him
to sign it and he didn't know what he was doing,
or practicing artifice on him by sleight of hand
or some ruse. This is after he got him to sign
he hung on him. To me it may mean that he is
simply going to have to pay this. This is hanging
one on him you see, so that is the reason that I
ruled as I did. I wanted to clarify it. All right,
when I said it was vague that's what I meant.

***"

(R. lll-ll2)

3. Offer of Proof as to negligence of Mackley in

failing to act as a reasonable, prudent banker in
handling the loan to Osborne.

Counsel for defendant Hudson offered the testimony of Mr. John M. Chatelain, Senior Examiner for
the Department of Financial Institutions of the State of
Utah which supervises banks, credit institutions, finance
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companies and savings and loan associations. The Cour!
asked Mr. Saperstein to make his offer of proof by war
of questions and answers out of the presence of the jur;.
After qualifying the witness counsel asked the followinu0
question starting at page 194 of the Record:
"Q. Asswne, if you will, .Nir. Chatelain, the
truthfulness of the following facts: That some.
time durmg the month of May of 1969, Ralpn
Osborne, who at that time was executive vice
president of the Moab National Bank, callea
James ,V. Mackley, who was at that time a loan
officer and correspondent bank representative
of the First National Bank in Grand Junction;
that the call came to Mr ..Mackley at his bank
office in Grand Junction, Colorado. Assume
that the purpose of the call was to solicit and '
obtain a loan for the benefit of Mr. Osborne in
the sum of sixty thousand dollars from the First
National Bank in Grand Junction. That is a loan
personally to Mr. Osborne. Assume that prior
to that date and for a period going back several
years, Mr. Osborne and his wife Norma had
previously borrowed money from the First Na·
tional Bank in Grand Junction and that on some
of those earlier loans Mr. Mackley was the loan
officer involved in approving and making the
loans. Assume that those earlier loans were never
for more than thirty-five hundred dollars. Assume
that there were three such loans. One in the
amount of approximately thirty-one or two hun·
dred dollars. Another in the amount of thirty.
one or two hundred dollars and one in the amount
of thirty-five hundred dollars. Assume that each
of thos~ loans were to be repaid in installments.
(R. 194) Assume that those installments had
been paid periodically in accordance with the
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terms of those notes. Assume further that there
had been additional borrowing by Ralph Osborne
and his wife Norma from the First National
Bank in Grand Junction on a short term noninstallment type note for a thousand dollars. That
had been renewed from time to time and eventually paid in full. Assume that all of these things
had been done and were paid prior to the conversation with Mackley by Osborne in May of
1969. Assume further that as a result of the
telephone call by Osborne to Mackley and during
the course of the conversation between the two
men that Mackley had requested, or that Osborne
had suggested that he have a co-signer or a guarantor for the proposed loan that he was seeking
to make from Mackley. That he advised Mackley that the guarantor or co-signer was a man
by the name of Jim L. Hudson. That Mackley
had indicated to Osborne that his financial statement that he had would not support that loan.
That he did not have a financial statement currently in his files of Ralph Osborne and that he
requesetd a financial sattement to be supplied
on Jim L. Hudson. Assume that pursuant to
the request by Mackley to Osborne, Osborne
subsequently mailed to Mackley the financial
statement that has been receiyed in evidence in
this case as Defendants, excuse me, as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 which you have examined.
Assume that in reliance upori. that financial statement :Mackley advised Osborne that the loan
would be made. Assume that upon receipt of
the financial statement Mackley sent a letter to
Osborne, a copy of which is, has been admitted
in this case as Defendants' Exhibit 28. Which
you have read. Assume that at the time he sent
Exhibit 28 to Osborne, Mackley enclosed with
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that letter the promissory note, Plaintiff's Ex
hibit a. (R. 195) The financial statement thJt
was received on the Defendant Jim L. Hudsou
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, was supplied Mackley b,:
Osborne. Assume further that Mackley did n~t
know Jim L. Hudson. That he had never hearo
of him, and assume further that he did nothino
to attempt to verify his financial responsibilit1:
Assume that he attempted to call Jim L. Huds~n
after receipt of the financial statement and be.
fore disbursing the funds to Ralph Osborne.
That he attempted a telephone call to Hudson
to Moab, and assume that that telephone call wa)
never completed. Assume that there was never
any answer at the other end. Assume that Mackley never spoke to anyone in connection with that
telephone call. Assume further that Mackley at
no time ever thereafter contacted Defendant
Jim L. Hudson in any way. Assume that h~
subsequently in response to his letter received
back in an envelope the promissory note Plain·
tiff's Exhibit No. 3, a current financial state·
ment of Ralph Osborne dated June 4, 1969.
And which has been received as Defendants'
Exhibit 26. And the loan guaranty agreement,
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. Assume that at the time
of the receipt of the loan guaranty agreement
the blanks where the words Colorado, and Grand
Junction, Colorado appear were not filled in.
And assume that other than that the loan guar·
anty agreement was as it appears today. As·
sume that there was no collateral or other se·
curity for this loan other than if we could call
it security, the alleged loan guaranty signed by
Hudson. Assume that the funds were thereafter
disbursed in accordance with the request of
Osborne. That no part of those funds were dis·
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bursed to t!1e Defendant Hudson. Assume that
the distance between Moab, Utah, and Grand
Junction, Colorado, is such that it can be driven
in a motor vehicle in about two to two and a
half hours. ( R. 196) Assume that James \V.
Mackley had authority to make loans in the
First National Bank of Grand Junction to the
full lending authority of the bank up to two hundred thousand dollars. Assume that he had that
authority without the necessity of referring a
loan to a loan committee or credit committee
or any officer or body of the bank. Assume that
the First National Bank in Grand Junction was
a correspondent bank for the Moab National
Bank. That in connection with his duties as correspondent bank representative of the First National Bank in Grand Junction that James W.
Mackley had become acquainted with Ralph
Osborne and had known him for some years.
Assume that in his periodic visits to the Moab
National Bank Mackley generally met with the
Defendant, or excuse me, met with the said Ralph
Osborne. Assume that the first time that Mackley ever contacted and discussed this loan and
guaranty with the Defendant Jim L. Hudson
was on the 6th day of April, 1970. Assuming
the truthfulness of all of those facts that I have
just stated to you, Mr. Chatelain, do you have
an opinion as to whether the conduct of Mackley
in making that loan to Ralph Osborne was conduct of an ordinary prudent banker under those
circumstances related?
"A. I have an opinion.
"Q. State your opinion.
"A. I feel that he did not act in accordance
with the conduct of completing a file in a prudent manner in this particular assumed situation.
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"Q ..l\Ir. Chatelain, assuming the truthfulne1,
of all those facts that I have just stated to you
do you have an opinion as to whether the condue:
of Jam es ~r. Mackley in making the loan 1
Ralph Osborne conformed with commercialJ1
reasonable standards in the banking industn:
(R. 197)
.
1

"A. I have.
"Q. And what is your opinion?
"A. That he did not conform to the reasonabh
acceptable standard of commercial lending. ·

"Q. Mr. Chatelain, what, in your opinion.
should James \V. Mackley have done in order !o
have conformed-\Vell, first I will ask it tht
way. In order to have acted as an ordinary pm
dent banker would have acted under the circumstances?

"MR. JENSEN: I think Hersch, maybehe has asked the hypothetical question, that ha1
been answered and that ends it.
"lVIR. SAPERSTEIN: No, no, I am making
an off er of proof, I'm not going to argue any
more. Let's just get it on the record. Would you
answer that question? I assume that you are
objecting to all of this?
"MR. JENSEN: Sure.
"A. \V ould you give me the question again 1
"Q. \Vhat should James W. Mackley hal'e
done in making this loan to Ralph Osborne had
he been at the time acting as an ordinary prudent
banker?
"A. A definite contact should have been made.
with the, Mr. Hudson. Since the loan was ob·
A-18

viously going to be made on the basis of his
guarantee. His file should have been complete,
completely documented in writing showing that
a contact had been made preferably in person,
but had he made the contact and knew of his
own certainty that he was talking to Mr. Hudson
then backed it up by documentation such as a
credit report in writing or a memorandum that
contact had been made through the credit bureau.
In other words, complete a file on this borrower
since he was unknown to the bank. (R. 198).
And since also that this amount was considerably
in excess of what had been usually transacted
or loans made to Mr. Osborne.
"Q. If I were to put the question to you this
way, l\fr.Chatelain, what should l\fr. Mackley
have done prior to disbursing these funds to Osborne, if he had acted in accordance with commercially reasonable standards of the banking
industry would your answer be the same as it was?

"A. The same.
"_MR. SAPERSTEIN: I think that is our
offer, Your Honor. As long as the jury is outI suppose l\lr. Chatelain may be excused.
"MR. JENSEN: Yes.*** (R. 199)
"THE COURT: I want to add the reason
that the testimony of Mr. Chatelain was not
received by the Court, I want to make a record
on that. In that the Court feels that it is irrelevant as to whether or not prudent practice was
followed with respect to the liability of the Defendant Hudson on the guaranty. The Court
is of the opinion that if he were to rule that every
time a banker acted imprudently or not reasonably in making a loan and had a guaranty that
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that loan or guaranty would be questionable ano
that would upset our whole commercial practice.
If we are going to say now here is a guaranry
or here is a co-signed note I wonder if the banker
who made that loan or the loan officer acted pru·
dently or reasonably? If he didn't, we have made,
left a perfect defense for the defendant to come
in and say the banker shouldn't have made that
loan, therefore the co-signer or guarantor shoulo
be released from his liability. And I don't think
that is the issue here. I think the sole issue here
is whether or not there was an imposition prac.
ticed upon l\h. Hudson to get his signaturi
to that loan guaranty agreement and whether
the bank had notice thereof. You may call in
the jury." (R. 201)
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